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INTRODUCTION
The claim of “disease” in a domestic setting has the same kind of power
as the claim of “national security” in matters relating to foreign policy.
Both claims are very powerful arguments for executive action. Both
claims are among those least likely to be questioned by any other branch
of government and therefore subject to abuse.1
In 2004, the Technology and Privacy Advisory Committee, appointed by the
U.S. Department of Defense “to examine the Terrorism Information
Awareness Program and to develop safeguards,” published its
recommendations for ensuring that Department of Defense technologies
respect U.S. law and privacy values.2 The Committee stated:


Professor of Health Law, Bioethics and Human Rights, Boston University School of
Public Health; Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law; Professor of SocioMedical Sciences, Boston University School of Medicine. J.D., Columbia University
School of Law; LL.M, New York University School of Law; M.P.H., Harvard School of
Public Health. Copyright 2007 Wendy K. Mariner.
1 City of Newark v. J.S., 652 A.2d 265, 271 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1993).
2 TECH. & PRIVACY ADVISORY COMM., U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., SAFEGUARDING PRIVACY IN
THE FIGHT AGAINST TERRORISM, at iii (2004) [hereinafter SAFEGUARDING PRIVACY],
available at http://www.cdt.org/security/usapatriot/20040300tapac.pdf.
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There are more than 650 million intelligence intercepts alone every day.
One of the most immediate challenges facing U.S. anti-terrorist activities
is separating out the “signal” of useful information from the “noise” of all
those data. More data are available than there are – or ever could be –
analysts to analyze it.
....
. . . If conducted without an adequate predicate, [data mining] has the
potential to be a 21st-century equivalent of general searches, which the
authors of the Bill of Rights were so concerned to protect against.3
The Committee was especially concerned that data legitimately collected with
“particularized suspicion”4 to find a suspected terrorist might later be used for
different purposes, such as ordinary law enforcement. This type of “mission
creep,” as the Committee called it, might not be so legitimate or socially
acceptable, and thus would require both specific regulation and careful
monitoring to ensure the protection of privacy.5
September 11, 2001, catalyzed a vast surveillance industry of data
collection, linkage, and mining.6 The expanded surveillance provoked
complaints that this response overstepped the bounds of liberty and privacy.7
Yet outrage was hardly universal, perhaps because most voters believed that
they were not under surveillance.8 When The New York Times reported on the
National Security Agency’s monitoring of domestic telephone calls, however,
public opinion began to change.9
3

Id. at 48-49 (footnote omitted).
Id. at 49.
5 See id. at 39-40.
6 For a description of the industry’s post-9/11 development, see generally ROBERT
O’HARROW, JR., NO PLACE TO HIDE (2005); Chris Jay Hoofnagle, Big Brother’s Little
Helpers: How ChoicePoint and Other Commercial Data Brokers Collect and Package Your
Data for Law Enforcement, 29 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 595 (2004).
7 See generally DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON: TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY IN
THE INFORMATION AGE (2004); Marc Rotenberg, Privacy and Secrecy After September 11,
86 MINN. L. REV. 1115 (2002); Daniel J. Solove, Digital Dossiers and the Dissipation of
Fourth Amendment Privacy, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1083 (2002); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Under a
Watchful Eye: Incursions on Personal Privacy, in THE WAR ON OUR FREEDOMS: CIVIL
LIBERTIES IN AN AGE OF TERRORISM 128 (Richard C. Leone & Greg Anrig, Jr. eds., 2003).
8 See generally DAVID COLE, ENEMY ALIENS: DOUBLE STANDARDS AND CONSTITUTIONAL
FREEDOMS IN THE WAR ON TERRORISM (2003); David Luban, Eight Fallacies About Liberty
and Security, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE ‘WAR ON TERROR’ 242 (Richard Ashby Wilson ed.,
2005).
9 See James Risen & Eric Lichtblau, Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers Without Courts, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 16, 2005, at A1. The American Bar Association House of Delegates, reacting
to the news story as well as an internal task force report, voted overwhelmingly to urge the
Bush administration to comply with the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), and
called on Congress to investigate the domestic surveillance program. ABA TASK FORCE ON
4
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Mission creep is also happening in the health sphere, and public attitudes
toward what is now called public health surveillance may follow a similar
trajectory.10 At the end of the nineteenth century, states began requiring
physicians to report cases of smallpox and other contagious diseases that could
cause epidemics.11 Polite society believed (or wished to believe) that such
diseases were concentrated in the disadvantaged classes, especially among
immigrants and prostitutes.12 The affluent classes could endorse compulsory
reporting laws to gain protection from illnesses without suffering the indignity
of having their own names reported.13

DOMESTIC SURVEILLANCE IN THE FIGHT AGAINST TERRORISM, REPORT WITH
RECOMMENDATIONS 1-5 (2006), available at http://www.abanet.org/op/greco/memos/
aba_house302-0206.pdf.
10 Public reaction may be primed by earlier reports that millions of records of identifiable
data had been lost by or stolen from credit and background checking companies such as
ChoicePoint and Bank of America, as well from educational institutions such as Boston
College and Tufts University. See, e.g., Bruce Mohl, Breach in Security Reaches 2d Credit
Firm, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 14, 2005, at E1 (reporting on security breaches at HSBC North
America, Boston College, Tufts University, and Bank of America); Tom Zeller Jr., Breach
Points Up Flaws in Privacy Laws, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 24, 2005, at C1 (reporting on the
ChoicePoint breach). Congress has introduced bills to impose stricter standards of privacy
and security on such companies. See Mohl, supra (reporting on two pending bills that
would create a notification requirement); Zeller, supra (reporting on bills submitted by
Senator Dianne Feinstein (D-Cal.) that would create a nationwide notification requirement).
In 2006, ChoicePoint settled Federal Trade Commission charges (of violating consumer
rights and privacy laws) by paying a $10 million civil fine and $5 million for consumer
redress. See Stipulated Final Judgment and Order for Civil Penalties, Permanent Injunction,
and Other Equitable Relief at 4, 17, United States v. ChoicePoint Inc., No. 1:06-CV-0198
(N.D. Ga. Feb. 15, 2006), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/choicepoint/
choicepoint.htm. ChoicePoint, which began by keeping insurance claim records, has
introduced new privacy protections. Gary Rivlin, Keeping Your Enemies Close, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 12, 2006, § 3, at 1. Additionally, the Department of Homeland Security plans
to increase cooperation between federal intelligence operations and local law enforcement.
Robert Block, Fighting Terrorism by Sharing Data, WALL ST. J., Oct. 16, 2006, at A6.
11 Michigan adopted the first such compulsory reporting law in 1883. JAMES A. TOBEY,
PUBLIC HEALTH LAW 133 (3d ed. 1947). By the mid-twentieth century, all states had
adopted laws requiring physicians (and often hospitals, laboratories, and other health
facilities) to report “notifiable,” “communicable,” or “dangerous” diseases to the state or
local health department. Id.
12 See generally JAMES A. MORONE, HELLFIRE NATION: THE POLITICS OF SIN IN
AMERICAN HISTORY (2003) (describing how the same groups have been blamed for the
spread of disease, violence, laziness (unwillingness to work), and sexual depravity
throughout U.S. history).
13 Turn of the century physicians initially objected to reporting on their paying patients,
believing it would violate physician-patient confidentiality or stigmatize their medical
practice. However, most reported on charity patients. See C.-E.A. WINSLOW, THE LIFE OF
HERMANN M. BIGGS: PHYSICIAN AND STATESMAN OF THE PUBLIC HEALTH 134 (1929).
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Today, almost everyone, regardless of station, could be subject to public
health surveillance. The scope of public health surveillance has grown
significantly beyond its contagious disease origins. Public health organizations
now recommend compulsory reporting of more than sixty infectious diseases,
twenty-nine genetic conditions (for newborns), almost all types of cancer, and
other chronic diseases like asthma and lupus.14 The Bush administration’s
National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza has given the Department of
Homeland Security the task of developing a National Biosurveillance
Integration System (NBIS) to integrate surveillance data about agriculture,
food, environment, and human diseases.15 In January 2006, the New York
City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene began requiring laboratories to
submit electronic reports of the blood sugar test results of all patients with
diabetes, by name and without patient consent.16 The Health Department
intends to contact patients who are not controlling their blood sugar to
encourage taking medications, better diet, and more exercise.17 Although there
will always be a need to investigate disease outbreaks in order to prevent
epidemics, the more prevalent use of disease surveillance data today is for
statistical analysis, planning, budgeting, and general research.18
This new generation of reporting laws reflects a goal of many people in
public health: to collect data about chronic diseases outside the context of a
research study and without the need to obtain any individual patient’s informed
14 See, e.g., MATERNAL & CHILD HEALTH BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVS., NEWBORN SCREENING: TOWARD A UNIFORM SCREENING PANEL AND SYSTEM 7-11
(2005), available at http://mchb.hrsa.gov/screening; CDC, Nationally Notifiable Diseases
Surveillance System, http://www.cdc.gov/epo/dphsi/nndsshis.htm (last visited Apr. 1, 2007).
15 See generally HOMELAND SEC. COUNCIL, NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR PANDEMIC
INFLUENZA: IMPLEMENTATION PLAN (2006), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/
homeland/nspi_implementation.pdf. The proposed Bioterrorism Act of 2005 (formally
titled “Protecting America in the War on Terror Act of 2005”) would “establish and
maintain a national electronic surveillance program” that goes beyond detecting a bioterror
attack to creating a general health database for studying health trends. S. 3, 109th Cong.
§ 172 (2005). The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) has already
developed the National Electronic Disease Surveillance System (NEDSS), intended to bring
all kinds of reporting systems into one national integrated electronic database. See generally
CDC, National Electronic Disease Surveillance System, http://www.cdc.gov/
nedss (last visited Apr. 1, 2007).
16 N.Y., N.Y., HEALTH CODE art. 13, § 13.04 (Dec. 14, 2005) (effective Jan. 15, 2006).
17 For a discussion of the regulation, its rationale, and possible legal challenges, see
generally Wendy K. Mariner, Medicine and Public Health: Crossing Legal Boundaries, 10
J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 121 (2007).
18 Stephen B. Thacker, Historical Development, in PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE OF PUBLIC
HEALTH SURVEILLANCE 1, 6 (Steven M. Teutsch & R. Elliott Churchill eds., 2d ed. 2000);
see also TRUST FOR AMERICA’S HEALTH, IMPROVING CANCER TRACKING TODAY SAVES LIVES
TOMORROW: DO STATES MAKE THE GRADE? 1-4 (2003), available at http://
healthyamericans.org/state/cancergrade/pdf/FullReport.pdf (describing the value of cancer
data for research).
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consent. The question is whether these new surveillance programs should be
able to compel the collection of personally identifiable data. Is it possible to
reconcile individual interests in personal privacy with modern forms of public
health surveillance? Are mandatory public health surveillance programs that
focus on statistical analysis, research, or monitoring personal health status a
reasonable exercise of the state’s police power, or are they vulnerable to
challenge as an invasion of privacy? Do they offer the promise of medical
advances, or the threat of “general searches, which the authors of the Bill of
Rights were so concerned to protect against”?19 This Article begins to answer
these questions.
Part I summarizes the evolution of public health surveillance programs. Part
II describes three major functions of surveillance programs: outbreak
investigation, identifying newborns who need essential medical care, and
research. It also highlights how the aim of those who collect medical
information has shifted from preventing the spread of contagious diseases to
the more general purposes of research, budget analysis, and policy planning.20
This shift poses a challenge to the principles of liberty and privacy that
underpin one’s individual autonomy to decide whether to participate in
research or to accept medical care.
Part III argues that the sparse case law on constitutional challenges to
compulsory reporting laws offers only a fragile conceptual framework for
modern public health statutes that compel the disclosure of personally
identifiable information. The cases themselves offer little guidance, often
ignoring how surveillance information is used and how valuable the right of
privacy is to individuals. Modern health surveillance programs, with their
focus on obtaining data accurate enough to use for statistical analysis and
research, do not easily fit the legal constructs guiding earlier laws designed to
prevent epidemics. At the same time, the general goal of improving public
health fails to provide any principle for limiting government intrusions into
medical privacy.
The Article concludes that modern public health surveillance needs
defensible principles that define the scope and limits of state power to collect
personally identifiable medical information. Part IV outlines a more robust
approach to balancing the state’s interest in public health and the individual’s
interest in the privacy of medical information. This approach weighs the
present value of the actual use of the information (instead of speculative longrange goals) against the dignitary value of privacy. Although space precludes
a fully developed argument, I hope this Article will inspire thoughtful efforts to
retain the value of modern public health surveillance without sacrificing the
value of patient privacy.
19

SAFEGUARDING PRIVACY, supra note 2, at 48.
See generally Stephen B. Thacker & Joanna Buffington, Applied Epidemiology for the
21st Century, 30 INT’L J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 320 (2001) (arguing for the expanded application
of epidemiological research to improve public health).
20
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THE EVOLUTION OF PUBLIC HEALTH SURVEILLANCE

As the name implies, disease surveillance is the collection of data about
diseases and the individuals who have them. Its original purpose was to
identify people with communicable diseases21 so that public officials could
take prompt action to prevent an epidemic.22 Classically, disease surveillance
involved a public health official who would investigate an individual found to
have a communicable disease in order to find out where she might have
acquired the disease and who else might have been infected (an action known
as contact tracing).23 Individuals likely to transmit a communicable disease to
others could be subject to isolation,24 and geographic areas might also be
quarantined to protect against exposure to disease.25
21

Many statutes use the term “communicable” as a synonym for “contagious” to
emphasize person-to-person transmission of infection and, by implication, to exclude
application to other “infectious” diseases. “Infectious” diseases include any disease that can
be transmitted to a human being from any source, whether human, animal, or
environmental. Communicable or contagious diseases are a subcategory of infectious
diseases that can only be transmitted from one human to another. David Heymann,
Infectious Agents, in 1 OXFORD TEXTBOOK OF PUBLIC HEALTH 171 (Roger Detels et al. eds.,
4th ed. 2002).
22 See CDC, 50 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP., NO. RR-13, UPDATED
GUIDELINES FOR EVALUATING PUBLIC HEALTH SURVEILLANCE SYSTEMS 2 (2001) [hereinafter
CDC, UPDATED GUIDELINES], available at http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/PDF/rr/rr5013.pdf
(“Public health surveillance is the ongoing, systematic collection, analysis, interpretation,
and dissemination of data regarding a health-related event for use in public health action to
reduce morbidity and mortality and to improve health.”). See generally Guthrie S. Birkhead
& Christopher M. Maylahn, State and Local Public Health Surveillance, in PRINCIPLES AND
PRACTICE OF PUBLIC HEALTH SURVEILLANCE, supra note 18, at 253.
23 See generally Kumnuan Ungchusak, Principles of Outbreak Investigation, in 2
OXFORD TEXTBOOK OF PUBLIC HEALTH, supra note 21, at 529.
24 See, e.g., City of Newark v. J.S., 652 A.2d 265, 267-68 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div.
1993) (ordering involuntary hospitalization of a homeless man who could not avoid
exposing the public to his active, contagious tuberculosis).
25 See Jew Ho v. Williamson, 103 F. 10, 24 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1900) (striking down a
quarantine for plague in San Francisco on equal protection grounds because it confined only
Chinese inhabitants and also because it arbitrarily confined exposed and non-exposed
people in the same area); Wong Wai v. Williamson, 103 F. 1, 9-10 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1900)
(same). For a history of the epidemic, see generally MARILYN CHASE, THE BARBARY
PLAGUE: THE BLACK DEATH IN VICTORIAN SAN FRANCISCO (2003). For a history of the
quarantine of immigrants to New York City for cholera, see generally HOWARD MARKEL,
QUARANTINE!: EAST EUROPEAN JEWISH IMMIGRANTS AND THE NEW YORK CITY EPIDEMICS OF
1892 (1997). Quarantine of large populations has almost never prevented an epidemic, and
is not generally recommended today. Joseph Barbera et al., Large-Scale Quarantine
Following Biological Terrorism in the United States, 286 JAMA 2711, 2715-16 (2001). A
contemporary example is China’s threat of quarantine to prevent the spread of SARS in
2003, where public fear of the quarantine led hundreds of thousands to flee Beijing. See
Joseph Kahn, Quarantine Set in Beijing Areas To Fight SARS, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 25, 2003, at
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Around 1879, the Marine Hospital Service (predecessor to the Public Health
Service) began to collect data on diseases like cholera and yellow fever in
order to prepare for quarantine measures for ships arriving in U.S. ports.26
Later, case reporting began on the state level.27 The Council of State and
Territorial Epidemiologists (CSTE), a private professional association of
epidemiologists employed primarily by state and local health departments, was
organized later to make periodic recommendations concerning which diseases
states should track.28
In the latter part of the twentieth century, disease surveillance expanded to
monitor new disease trends, and the more comprehensive term “public health
surveillance” increasingly replaced “disease surveillance” (at least among
public health professionals).29 As infectious diseases claimed fewer lives in
A1. See generally INST. FOR BIOETHICS, HEALTH POLICY & LAW, UNIV. OF LOUISVILLE SCH.
OF MED., QUARANTINE AND ISOLATION: LESSONS LEARNED FROM SARS (2003), available at
http://mmrs.fema.gov/PublicDocs/2003-11_SARS_Quarantine_Rpt.pdf.
26 The Marine Hospital Service was originally created to care for merchant seaman. An
Act for the Relief of Sick and Disabled Seamen, ch. 77, 1 Stat. 605 (1798). The Quarantine
Act of 1878 gave the Marine Hospital Service the power to quarantine ships arriving in U.S.
ports, to conduct medical examinations of immigrants, and to report the name and
destinations of any ships leaving infected ports. An Act To Prevent the Introduction of
Contagious or Infectious Diseases into the United States, ch. 66, 20 Stat. 37 (1878). By
1912, the year in which the Marine Hospital Service was renamed the Public Health Service,
Congress had authorized field studies to investigate the “diseases of man and . . . the
pollution of navigable streams.” RALPH C. WILLIAMS, THE UNITED STATES PUBLIC HEALTH
SERVICE, 1798-1950, at 167 (1951); see also FITZHUGH MULLAN, PLAGUES AND POLITICS:
THE STORY OF THE UNITED STATES PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE 58 (1989). Executive orders
still list quarantinable diseases in order to protect national ports from contagion. President
Bush added anthrax to the list in 2001, then SARS in 2003, and then “[i]nfluenza caused by
novel or reemergent influenza viruses that are causing, or have the potential to cause, a
pandemic,” in 2005. Exec. Order No. 13,295, 3 C.F.R. 220 (2004), amended by Exec. Order
No. 13,375, 3 C.F.R. 162 (2006) (relying on the authority granted to the President by the
Public Health Service Act § 361, 42 U.S.C. § 264(b) (2000)).
27 See, e.g., Michael A. Stoto, Population Health Monitoring, in HEALTH STATISTICS:
SHAPING POLICY AND PRACTICE TO IMPROVE THE POPULATION’S HEALTH 317, 322-24 (Daniel
J. Friedman et al. eds., 2005).
28 See Sandra Roush et al., Mandatory Reporting of Diseases and Conditions by Health
Care Professionals and Laboratories, 281 JAMA 164, 164 (1999).
29 See Thacker, supra note 18, at 1-16; Steven B. Thacker & Donna F. Stroup, Future
Directions for Comprehensive Public Health Surveillance and Health Information Systems
in the United States, 140 AM. J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 383, 384 (1994). This shift to public health
surveillance follows a shift away from communicable disease prevention to personal health
promotion. Attention to health promotion may date from 1974, when Canada published the
landmark Lalonde Report. See generally MARC LALONDE, A NEW PERSPECTIVE ON THE
HEALTH OF CANADIANS (1974), available at http://www.hc-sc.gc.ca/hcs-sss/alt_formats/hpbdgps/pdf/pubs/1974-lalonde/lalonde_e.pdf.
U.S. Surgeon General Julius Richmond
published a similar report, Healthy People, in 1979, initiating the periodic review of
Americans’ overall health status and setting goals for improvement. See generally U.S.
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the United States,30 chronic diseases, such as heart disease and cancer, became
the leading causes of death.31 Such diseases are influenced, if not caused, by a
variety of social, environmental, genetic, and behavioral factors, and public
health surveillance seeks to identify these factors.32 Today, surveillance
programs exist for a variety of cancers, genetic conditions of newborns, and
occupational diseases, as well as other health-related events like
immunizations, injuries, and adverse drug reactions.33 Unlike earlier reporting
systems, chronic disease programs are not intended to intervene with
individual cases.34 People with cancer or diabetes, of course, pose no threat of
contagion. Reducing the risk of chronic diseases is not as simple as shutting
off a cholera-contaminated water supply, pasteurizing milk, or constructing
sewers. It requires a far more complex set of programs.
As disease prevention has become more complex, data collection tools have
become more sophisticated. Case reporting is only one method of data
collection.35 Other methods include population surveys, medical record
reviews, and epidemiological and behavioral research studies aimed at
DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., HEALTHY PEOPLE 2010 (2d ed. 2000), available at
http://www.health.gov/healthypeople/document.
30 See COMM. ON EMERGING MICROBIAL THREATS TO HEALTH, INST. OF MED., EMERGING
INFECTIONS: MICROBIAL THREATS TO HEALTH IN THE UNITED STATES 151-53 (1992)
(commenting on the elimination of diseases like smallpox and the reduced risk of other
contagious diseases like measles and tuberculosis in the twentieth century).
31 See Arialdi M. Miniño et al., Deaths: Preliminary Data for 2004, NAT’L VITAL STAT.
REP., June 28, 2006, at 1, 4 (reporting data on the major causes of death in the United States,
of which the top three are heart disease, cancers, and stroke).
32 ALAN PETERSEN & DEBORAH LUPTON, THE NEW PUBLIC HEALTH , at i (1996) (“The
new public health takes as its foci the categories of ‘population’ and ‘the environment,’
conceived of in their widest sense to include psychological, social and physical elements.”);
Wendy K. Mariner, Law and Public Health: Beyond Emergency Preparedness, 38 J.
HEALTH L. 247, 252-54 (2005) (arguing that the public health field may pay increasing
attention to the “social determinants of health” in the future); see also Elizabeth Fee, The
Origins and Development of Public Health in the United States, in 1 OXFORD TEXTBOOK OF
PUBLIC HEALTH 35, 45-46 (Roger Detels et al. eds., 3d ed. 1997) (discussing the
“epidemiological transition” of the postwar era).
33 See Stephen B. Thacker et al., Public Health Surveillance for Chronic Conditions: A
Scientific Basis for Decisions, 14 STAT. MED. 629, 629-30 (1995).
34 A pilot study looking at surveillance programs in eight states (Arkansas, Colorado,
Florida, Maine, Michigan, New York, Oregon, and Wisconsin) found that surveillance data
was most commonly used to compile statistics for the CDC. Emilie Curry, Public Health
Surveillance Data Survey 13 & fig.7 (2004) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
35 In case reporting, physicians (and others) report their diagnoses to a local or state
health department. Reports were first made by sending a postcard; more detailed forms
followed. Cases requiring urgent intervention are reported by telephone. Now, electronic
transmission of diagnoses is beginning. Nevertheless, the basic structure of case reporting
systems today differs little from the original design, even though details like reporting forms
and available medications have evolved. See Stoto, supra note 27, at 321.
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determining the distribution, incidence, and causation of diseases across
locations and populations, as well as the effects of prevention and treatment
interventions.36 Such data allow statistical analyses and research in order to
identify and recommend ways to avoid illnesses.37 The data are also used to
determine government funding for public and private programs, such as AIDS
treatment under the Ryan White CARE Act.38
While medical science has reduced the need for intervening with individuals
to control disease, information technology has increased the ease and utility of
obtaining and disseminating information.39 The information revolution made it
possible to collect large amounts of information about people, including
medical information, combine it with different databases (record linkage) for
various analyses,40 and transmit it electronically all over the world.41 As one

36 See generally Julie A. Pavlin et al., Innovative Surveillance Methods for Rapid
Detection of Disease Outbreaks and Bioterrorism: Results of an Interagency Workshop on
Health Indicator Surveillance, 93 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1230 (2003). The National Health
Interview Survey has been conducted periodically since the mid-twentieth century, under
the auspices of the National Center for Health Statistics. For an example of a more targeted
study, see Edward H. Kaplan & Ron Brookmeyer, Snapshot Estimators of Recent HIV
Incidence Rates, 47 OPERATIONS RES. 29, 31-35 (1999) (developing mathematical models of
the incidence of HIV infection and then applying the models to data collected by
government agencies).
37 The information can also be used to identify specific populations in need of health
services. Smallpox was eradicated in the United States by identifying areas where people
had not been immunized and making concerted efforts to persuade them to get the vaccine.
Ruth L. Berkelman et al., Public Health Surveillance, in 2 OXFORD TEXTBOOK OF PUBLIC
HEALTH, supra note 21, at 759, 760.
38 Ryan White Comprehensive AIDS Resources Emergency Act of 1990, Pub. L. No.
101-381, 104 Stat. 576 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.), amended
by Ryan White HIV/AIDS Treatment Modernization Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-415, 120
Stat. 2767.
39 Public health surveillance programs might be analogized to fire departments.
Although fires are rare events, firefighters must be ready to respond on a moment’s notice to
control the fires that do occur and to prevent a conflagration. Firefighters find other things
to do while waiting for a fire, such as inspecting fire alarms and attending to emergencies
other than fires. Epidemics of communicable disease are rare events in the United States,
but those that do occur often require a large effort that could not be mounted from scratch.
Public health programs provide a ready infrastructure. In down times, public health
surveillance programs perform other tasks, such as statistical analyses of disease trends and
research about the causes and consequences of diseases.
40 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, NO. GAO-01-126SP, RECORD LINKAGE AND PRIVACY:
ISSUES IN CREATING NEW FEDERAL RESEARCH AND STATISTICAL INFORMATION 1 (2001),
available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d01126sp.pdf (defining record linkage as “a
computer-based process that combines multiple sources of existing data”).
41 The federal regulations on medical information privacy that resulted from the Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) were inspired by the federal
government’s desire to have all medical providers keep electronic medical records that
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leading text explains, “Public health surveillance information is used to assess
public health status, define public health priorities, evaluate programs, and
conduct research.”42 Nonetheless, before September 11, 2001, public health
agencies had not persuaded the public to compel reporting of personally
identifiable health information for all these purposes.
The five deaths from anthrax letters sent in October 2001 fueled fears that
terrorists might use chemical or biological agents to attack the United States.43
The SARS epidemic in 2003 revived fears of natural epidemics.44 Both the
possibility of bioterrorism and new natural epidemics like avian influenza45
inspired new legislation to collect vast amounts of medical information in an
attempt to detect cases in time to prevent the further spread of disease.46
could be easily transmitted wherever they were needed and comparable across different
institutions for purposes of federal benefit payment programs. See 45 C.F.R. pts. 160, 164
(2006). Recognizing that such ease of access to personal medical information might raise
concern among the public, Congress required that either legislation or regulations be
produced to protect the privacy of personal medical information. When Congress failed to
act, the Department of Health and Human Services adopted regulations (the HIPAA Privacy
Rule). Attempts to create a nationwide system of electronic medical records have stalled in
Congress. Ricardo Alonso-Zaldivar, Bill Seeks National Medical Records System, L.A.
TIMES, Aug. 13, 2006, at A22. Supporters believe that having records electronically
accessible anywhere in the country would improve quality and prevent medical errors, but
critics argue that current attempts to establish such a system contain too few privacy
safeguards. See id.
42 Thacker, supra note 18, at 6.
43 See John A. Jernigan et al., Bioterrorism-Related Inhalational Anthrax: The First 10
Cases Reported in the United States, 7 EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES 933, 934 (2001)
(describing the first ten reported cases, both fatal and non-fatal, in the anthrax outbreak).
44 See generally LEARNING FROM SARS: PREPARING FOR THE NEXT DISEASE OUTBREAK
(Stacey Knobler et al. eds., 2004) [hereinafter LEARNING FROM SARS], available at
http://books.nap.edu/html/SARS/0309091543.pdf; WORLD HEALTH ORG., SEVERE ACUTE
RESPIRATORY SYNDROME (SARS) (2003), available at http://www.who.int/csr/media/
sars_wha.pdf; World Health Org., Summary of Probable SARS Cases with Onset of Illness
from 1 November 2002 to 31 July 2003, http://www.who.int/csr/sars/country/
table2004_04_21/en/index.html (last visited Apr. 1, 2007)
45 See generally Arnold S. Monto, The Threat of Avian Influenza Pandemic, 352 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 323 (2005); Klaus Stöhr, Avian Influenza and Pandemics – Research Needs
and Opportunities, 352 NEW ENG. J. MED. 405 (2005); Kumnuan Ungchusak et al.,
Probable Person-to-Person Transmission of Avian Influenza A (H5N1), 352 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 333 (2005).
46 On October 23, 2001, the CDC released a “model state law” on emergency powers
that, among other things, would require physicians and hospitals to report patients with any
infectious disease to the state health department and require drug stores to report sales of
prescription and over-the-counter medications for respiratory illnesses. See MODEL STATE
EMERGENCY HEALTH POWERS ACT § 301 (Ctr. for Law & the Public’s Health 2001), revised
version available at http://www.publichealthlaw.net/MSEHPA/MSEHPA2.pdf; see also
George J. Annas, Bioterrorism, Public Health, and Civil Liberties, 346 NEW ENG. J. MED.
1337, 1338-39 (2002) (“[T]he authority to respond to a bioterrorist attack or a new epidemic
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Public health agencies welcomed federal bioterrorism grants to fund
surveillance programs.47 Put forth just as the Bush administration proposed to
collect other personal information to find possible terrorists, the collection of
information for purposes of analyzing disease outbreaks and trends appeared to
further diminish personal privacy.48 Soon thereafter came public reports that
records held by private companies and public agencies had been lost or
obtained by fraudulent means.49 Public sentiment about providing personal
information to the government or private companies has appeared to whipsaw
between support in the name of preventing terrorism and opposition due to
fears of government invasions of privacy.50
So-called emergency preparedness programs might have returned disease
surveillance to its contagious disease roots. But public health had already
grown far beyond them, sweeping all health conditions into its sphere of
interest. New information technology encourages both more surveillance and
new uses for the data collected, from changing the environment to changing
individual behavior. Surveillance programs have traditionally been diseasespecific, but the present federal attention to terrorism has been encouraging

that the model act provides is much too broad, since it applies not just to real emergencies
such as a smallpox attack but also to nonemergency conditions as diverse as annual
influenza epidemics and the AIDS epidemic.”).
47 The Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002,
Pub. L. No. 107-188, 116 Stat. 594, authorized funding to improve public health
surveillance and reporting at the state and local level, and to integrate federal, state, and
local systems. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 247d-4(b), 300hh(b)(2) (Supp. IV 2004). Proponents
argued that bioterrorism surveillance would have dual uses – detecting both terrorist attacks
and disease outbreaks caused by nature or accident. Critics argued that such measures
would be counterproductive and that the public would be better served by providing public
health services. See generally Hillel W. Cohen et al., The Pitfalls of Bioterrorism
Preparedness: The Anthrax and Smallpox Experiences, 94 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1667
(2004).
48 Public concern was sparked by the Total Information Awareness (later called
Terrorism Information Awareness) program headed by John Poindexter, who was forced to
resign as a result of the controversy. See O’HARROW, supra note 6, at 191-98, 203-13.
49 See Jonathan Krim, Customer Data Lost, Citigroup Unit Says, WASH. POST, June 7,
2005, at A1; Robert O’Harrow Jr., Agencies Not Protecting Privacy Rights, GAO Says,
WASH. POST, Apr. 5, 2006, at A9; David Stout & Tom Zeller Jr., Vast Data Cache About
Veterans Is Stolen, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 2006, at A1; see also sources cited supra note 10.
50 See News Release, Harris Interactive, The Benefits of Electronic Medical Records
Sound Good, but Privacy Could Become a Difficult Issue (Feb. 8, 2007), available at
http://www.harrisinteractive.com/news/allnewsbydate.asp?NewsID=1174; Alan F. Westin,
Professor Emeritus, Columbia Univ., Presentation at the Hearing on Privacy and Health
Information Technology of the Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Nat’l Comm. on Vital &
Health Statistics, Subcomm. on Privacy & Confidentiality (Feb. 23, 2005), available at
http://ncvhs.hhs.gov/050223tr.htm.
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coordinated systems that link all types of health information in an electronic
database.51
Most state surveillance programs today receive funding from federal
agencies, primarily the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC).52
Federal agencies have no authority to require states to pass specific laws, but
the CDC’s recommendations, together with the leverage of funding and the
utility of the resulting data analyses, encourage states to adopt compulsory
reporting laws.53 States do not necessarily require reporting of all the
recommended diseases and conditions.54 They do, however, voluntarily
submit case reports on most diseases they receive to the CDC.55
Data collected by public health surveillance flows through at least three
levels, as shown in Figure 1 below. A provider initially collects information
from a patient, either orally or from physical examination or diagnostic tests.
In the first level of surveillance, the provider reports (discloses) the patient’s
information to a third party, usually a state or local health department, when
required by state reporting laws.56 Some health departments outsource the
collection of data to a private entity, usually university researchers. At the
second level, the state health department reports (discloses) the patient’s
information to the CDC, without the patient’s name.57

51

See, e.g., CDC, BioSense, http://www.cdc.gov/biosense (last visited Apr. 1, 2007);
CDC, Public Health Information Network (PHIN), http://www.cdc.gov/PHIN (last visited
Apr. 1, 2007).
52 The CDC has general authority to “conduct in the [Public Health] Service, and
encourage, cooperate with, and render assistance to other appropriate public authorities,
scientific institutions, and scientists in the conduct of, and promote the coordination of,
research, investigations, experiments, demonstrations, and studies related to the causes,
diagnosis, treatment, control, and prevention of physical and mental diseases and
impairments of man.” Public Health Service Act § 301(a), 42 U.S.C. § 241(a) (2000). The
CDC is also authorized to “collect and make available through publications and other
appropriate means, information as to, and the practical application of, such research and
other activities,” see 42 U.S.C. § 241(a)(1), and to cooperate with and advise the states on
matters relating to the public health, see 42 U.S.C. § 243.
53 See CDC, UPDATED GUIDELINES, supra note 22, at 1.
54 For example, in 1995 and 1996, the CSTE and CDC recommended adding elevated
blood lead levels, silicosis, acute pesticide poisoning, and tobacco use. Roush et al., supra
note 28, at 165.
55 See supra note 15.
56 Outbreaks are often reported to the local health department, which then reports to the
state health department. See, e.g., WIS. STAT. ANN. § 252.05 (West 2007); 105 MASS. CODE
REGS. §§ 300.100, 300.110 (2007).
57 State law usually authorizes the health department to submit reports to the CDC. It
may also authorize the state to allow a different branch of the health department or external
researchers to use the data. The release of identifiable data for such secondary research
usually requires prior approval by a state agency (and a university’s institutional review
board) charged with protecting the welfare of human subjects of research.
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Figure 1. Surveillance Data Flow Chart
Reporting
Disclosure
Level
Patient

Hospital - - - - - - - - - Physician - - - - - - - - Laboratory
1
Primary
State
Private
Health - - - - - - - - - - Research
Department
Organization
2
Secondary

CDC

NCI

3
Tertiary

Private
Research
Organizations

WHO

Other federal agencies
[DHS, DOL, DOD, HHS
(FDA, HRSA, CMM, AHCPR)]

Key: · Dashed lines indicate a contractual/grant relationship.
· Arrows indicate the direction of data reporting.
Note: In Level 1, provider reports of contagious disease cases sometimes go
to their local health department (if immediate response is needed), and
the local health department then forwards the reports to the state health
department. Also, in Level 1, states sometimes contract with university
researchers to receive data from providers for specific programs like
cancer registries.
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At the third level, the CDC sends reports of aggregated national data to the
World Health Organization (WHO). The CDC often authorizes other tertiary
uses of the data it receives, sharing it with other federal and international
agencies for a variety of purposes. Those agencies may combine the data with
their own databases and other external databases to conduct various research
studies.58
II.

FUNCTIONS OF SURVEILLANCE

Mandatory reporting laws are adopted for the purposes of protecting public
health and preventing (or controlling) disease. In examining whether such
goals warrant the different types of surveillance programs described above, we
immediately face a problem of definition. What is public health? What counts
as preventing or controlling disease? Definitions used in the public health field
are now so broad that they encompass anything that might possibly lead to
longer life expectancies or a better quality of life.59 Consider the following
commonly quoted definition from the Institute of Medicine: “Public health is
what we, as a society, do collectively to assure the conditions for people to be
healthy.”60 Using such a broad conception, almost anything could be found to
promote public health, at least in the long run. If this conception of public
health justified the exercise of the state’s police power, then the state would
58 See generally U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 40; WORLD HEALTH ORG.,
ENGAGING FOR HEALTH (2006), available at http://whqlibdoc.who.int/publications/2006/
GPW_eng.pdf.
59 See, e.g., Abdelmonem A. Afifi & Lester Breslow, The Maturing Paradigm of Public
Health, 15 ANN. REV. PUB. HEALTH 223, 232 (1994) (“Public health practice embraces all
those actions that are directed to the assessment of health and disease problems in the
population; the formulation of policies for dealing with such problems; and the assurance of
environmental, behavioral, and medical services designed to accelerate favorable health
trends and reduce the unfavorable.”). See generally COMM. ON ASSURING THE HEALTH OF
THE PUB. IN THE 21ST CENTURY, I NST. OF MED., THE FUTURE OF THE PUBLIC’S HEALTH IN THE
21ST CENTURY (2003).
60 COMM. FOR THE STUDY OF THE FUTURE OF PUB. HEALTH, INST. OF MED., THE FUTURE
OF PUBLIC HEALTH 19 (1988). Nearly a century ago, one scholar proposed a more detailed
definition that many would still find accurate today:
Public health is the science and the art of preventing disease, prolonging life, and
promoting physical health and efficiency through organized community efforts for the
sanitation of the environment, the control of community infections, the education of the
individual in principles of personal hygiene, the organization of medical and nursing
service for the early diagnosis and preventive treatment of disease, and the
development of the social machinery which will ensure to every individual in the
community a standard of living adequate for the maintenance of health.
C.-E.A. Winslow, The Untilled Fields of Public Health, 51 SCIENCE 23, 30 (1920). For yet
another recent definition, see BERNARD J. TURNOCK, PUBLIC HEALTH: WHAT IT IS AND HOW
IT WORKS 11 (3d ed. 2004) (“[P]ublic health . . . is a broad social enterprise, more akin to a
movement, that seeks to extend the benefits of current knowledge in ways that will have the
maximum impact on the health status of a population.”).
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have the authority to enact a wide range of coercive laws, from mandatory
reporting of identifiable information to requiring everyone to obey their
physicians’ recommendations or eat a prescribed diet. Like public welfare,
public health is a broad, often vague and malleable concept, susceptible to
differing interpretations. This quality undermines its ability to serve as a
coherent or even rational basis for compulsory reporting of personal
information.61 A closer look at surveillance programs, however, suggests that,
in fact, they serve three more specific and immediate functions: outbreak
investigation, identifying newborns for essential medical care, and scientific
research. The following sections describe these functions and their uses of
personally identifiable information.
A.

Origins and Core Meanings: Outbreak Investigation

Definitions of disease surveillance typically combine the concept of data
collection with that of taking action to prevent the spread of disease.62
Reporting systems were, as discussed above, originally designed to detect
outbreaks and prevent epidemics.63 Reports to the health department usually
included the patient’s name and address because of the potential need to
contact the patient. Timeliness was also a factor. Investigators needed to
know within hours or days that highly contagious diseases such as smallpox
had been diagnosed in order to find the source of infection and investigate
whether and where it might have spread. Only with quick access to such
information could they protect others from imminent infection. Thus, one
useful criterion for characterizing data for outbreak investigation and epidemic
control is that the data are needed right away to prevent imminent harm.
However, outbreak investigation and epidemic containment comprise only
one purpose of surveillance activity today. If mandatory reporting systems
were limited to data needed right away to prevent imminent harm, they would
not bother to collect reports about the vast majority of illnesses, which are
handled adequately by attending physicians. Nevertheless, case reporting
systems and mandatory reporting laws typically insist on reports of every case,
61

See Wendy E. Parmet, From Slaughter-House to Lochner: The Rise and Fall of the
Constitutionalization of Public Health, 40 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 476, 477 (1996).
62 See Alexander D. Langmuir, The Surveillance of Communicable Diseases of National
Importance, 268 NEW ENG. J. MED. 182, 182-83 (1963) (defining surveillance as “the
continued watchfulness over the distribution and trends of incidence through the systematic
collection, consolidation, and evaluation of morbidity and mortality reports and other
relevant data” together with timely and regular dissemination to those who “need to know”);
see also Berkelman et al., supra note 37, at 759; James W. Buehler, Surveillance, in
MODERN EPIDEMIOLOGY 435, 435 (Kenneth J. Rothman & Sander Greenland eds., 2d ed.
1998); Stephen B. Thacker & Ruth L. Berkelman, Public Health Surveillance in the United
States, 10 EPIDEMIOLOGY REV. 164, 164 (1988).
63 Outbreak investigations are not limited to contagious diseases. They also include
investigations into sources of poisoning, such as pesticides used in the environment, at least
where there is no obvious cause.
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just to be sure no case is missed.64 However, the required reports are rarely
submitted or reviewed more often than once a week.65 Knowing this, a
physician who recognizes a dangerous disease typically telephones the health
department to get a timely response.66
Traditional case reporting systems are not well suited to rapidly detecting
epidemics or bioterrorist attacks using biological or chemical agents.67 In
recent epidemics, the most accurate, timely, and valuable information came not
from official reporting mechanisms, but from alert physicians caring for
patients.68 New electronic syndromic surveillance systems offer more promise,
64 Of course, cases that are not seen by a physician or, if seen, are incorrectly diagnosed,
will still be missed. This was the case in the SARS epidemic. The first North American
case of SARS was not recognized because the victim, a woman who had returned to Toronto
after visiting Hong Kong, died at home without seeking medical care on March 5, 2003.
Her son was hospitalized two days later and died on March 13, 2003. Four other family
members fell ill and were treated in isolation in four other hospitals, where SARS spread to
hospital staff and household contacts. See Monali Varia et al., Investigation of a
Nosocomial Outbreak of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) in Toronto, Canada,
169 CAN. MED. ASS’N J. 285, 288 (2003). See generally Tomislav Svoboda et al., Public
Health Measures To Control the Spread of the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome During
the Outbreak in Toronto, 350 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2352 (2004).
65 Many programs have small numbers of employees, with some working only part-time
on surveillance activities. See OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVS., STATE AND LOCAL BIOTERRORISM PREPAREDNESS, at i-ii (2002), available at
http://oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/oei-02-01-00550.pdf; U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, NO.
GAO-03-373, BIOTERRORISM: PREPAREDNESS VARIED ACROSS STATE AND LOCAL
JURISDICTIONS 17-22 (2003), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03373.pdf.
66 Many health departments require physicians to telephone reports of cases that need
immediate investigation, because ordinary weekly or monthly reports would come too late.
See J. Lyle Conrad & James L. Pearson, Improving Epidemiology, Surveillance, and
Laboratory Capabilities, in TERRORISM AND PUBLIC HEALTH 270, 271 (Barry S. Levy &
Victor W. Sidel eds., 2003).
67 See DENA M. BRAVATA ET AL., BIOTERRORISM PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE: USE OF
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGIES AND DECISION SUPPORT SYSTEMS 4 (2002), available at
http://www.ahrq.gov/downloads/pub/evidence/pdf/bioit/bioit.pdf; Syndromic Surveillance
for Bioterrorism Following the Attacks on the World Trade Center – New York City, 2001,
51 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. (SPECIAL ISSUE) 13, 13 (2002), available at http://
www.cdc.gov/mmwr/PDF/wk/mm51sp.pdf. After September 11 and in preparation for the
war in Iraq, the Bush administration encouraged the Department of Defense Advanced
Research Projects Agency (DARPA), headed by Vice Admiral John M. Poindexter, to
create a computerized network of data that could quickly detect a chemical or biological
attack against the United States. Responsibility for a new national bioterrorism warning
program was later transferred to civilian control in the CDC. William J. Broad & Judith
Miller, Health Data Monitored for Bioterror Warning, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27, 2003, at A1.
68 See Robert A. Weinstein, Planning for Epidemics – The Lessons of SARS, 350 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 2332, 2334 (2004). In China, physicians reported an outbreak of atypical
pneumonia to provincial hospitals in late January 2003, during the Chinese New Year
holiday. This was an unhappy coincidence, because many officials were on vacation and
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although perhaps less for early warnings of terrorism and epidemics than for
ordinary disease surveillance.69
Once installed, a computer program
automatically scans medical records, logs the number of symptoms of interest
without picking up personal information, and electronically transmits the totals
to the tracking station, typically in a city or state health department.70 The

could not attend to the report, while holiday travel probably exacerbated the spread of
disease. Dr. Carlos Urbani, a WHO official, feared that a patient he was treating in Hanoi
had avian influenza and contacted the WHO Pacific Regional Office. News of the outbreak
was sent through e-mail, internet chat rooms, and local media, rather than the official
reporting program. The WHO asked China for information and was told on February 14
that an outbreak consistent with atypical pneumonia was coming under control. LEARNING
FROM SARS, supra note 44, at 4-6. See generally U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, NO.
GAO-04-564, EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES: ASIAN SARS OUTBREAK CHALLENGED
INTERNATIONAL AND NATIONAL RESPONSES (2004).
69 A CDC official was reported in January 2003 as saying, “Whether this is going to
detect terrorism is unclear. But as a safety net and for tracking an event once it’s going on,
it’s very promising.” Broad & Miller, supra note 67; see also James W. Buehler et al.,
Syndromic Surveillance and Bioterrorism-Related Epidemics, 9 EMERGING INFECTIOUS
DISEASES 1197, 1197 (2003); Charlene Babcock Irvin et al., Syndromic Analysis of
Computerized Emergency Department Patients’ Chief Complaints: An Opportunity for
Bioterrorism and Influenza Surveillance, 41 ANNALS EMERGENCY MED. 447, 447 (2003);
Farzad Mostashari et al., Use of Ambulance Dispatch Data as an Early Warning System for
Communitywide Influenzalike Illness, New York City, 80 (Supp. 1) J. URB. HEALTH i43, i48
(2003); Julie A. Pavlin et al., Innovative Surveillance Methods for Rapid Detection of
Disease Outbreaks and Bioterrorism: Results of an Interagency Workshop on Health
Indicator Surveillance, 93 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1230, 1230 (2003).
70 See Kenneth D. Mandl et al., Implementing Syndromic Surveillance: A Practical
Guide Informed by the Early Experience, 11 J. AM. MED. INFORMATICS ASS’N 141, 141
(2004) (“The term syndromic surveillance refers to methods relying on detection of clinical
case features that are discernable before confirmed diagnoses are made.”). For example, the
computer tabulates the number of cases of respiratory distress, fever, headache, and nausea
seen, regardless of whether a diagnosis has been made. Arthur Reingold, If Syndromic
Surveillance Is the Answer, What Is the Question?, 1 BIOSECURITY & BIOTERRORISM:
BIODEFENSE STRATEGY, PRAC. & SCI. 77, 77 (2004); see also CDC, 53 MORBIDITY &
MORTALITY WKLY. REP., NO. RR-5, FRAMEWORK FOR EVALUATING PUBLIC HEALTH
SURVEILLANCE SYSTEMS FOR EARLY DETECTION OF OUTBREAKS: RECOMMENDATIONS FROM
THE CDC WORKING GROUP 2 (2004), available at http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/PDF/rr/
rr5305.pdf. The CDC BioSense Initiative is a syndromic surveillance system, intended to
provide an early warning of diseases that could produce an epidemic. CDC, BioSense,
supra note 51. CDC funds selected hospitals to participate in the program, including
Department of Defense and Veterans Affairs hospitals. Id. The National Strategy for
Pandemic Influenza calls for the BioSense Initiative to be established in forty-two cities
within twelve months – more than CDC had planned – although that goal may be
unrealistic. See Bob Brewin, Critics Question Biosurveillance System Plan, GOVERNMENT
HEALTH IT, May 8, 2006, available at http://www.govhealthit.com/article94303-05-08-06
(“[H]ealth officials . . . said the timelines for deploying and enhancing [disease surveillance]
systems are overly optimistic. The same officials criticized the Bush administration for
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tracking agency can review the data relatively promptly, often within twentyfour hours, and contact the hospital to see whether there is a dangerous
outbreak.71
Advantages of syndromic surveillance include speed and privacy. Most
systems do not collect patient names or other identifying information.72
Almost any passive system could be considered superior to a system that
requires affirmative action on the part of human beings. Syndromic
surveillance does have limitations, however.73 Systems can be expensive, both
to install and to operate.74 Because symptoms are common to many diseases,
surveillance will produce many false positives and trigger costly investigations
into ordinary cases of colds, influenza, and other uncomplicated viral
illnesses.75 Like sifting through billions of phone conversations, the task is to
sift through billions of health records to find a genuine threat to public health.
Thus, syndromic surveillance systems may be useful not for detecting
bioterrorism, but for detecting slowly developing natural disease outbreaks that
go unnoticed by individual physicians.76
failing to provide necessary funds to help them meet the challenges of combating a
pandemic.”).
71 For example, if the program shows an abnormally large number of cases of upper
respiratory problems, hospital staff might explain that a busload of students with the
common cold arrived at the hospital after a motor vehicle accident on a nearby highway. In
contrast, if there is no explanation, the health department might send an investigator to
interview patients still at the hospital to discover where they may have caught the illness.
At that point, the hospital could identify the patients to the health department so that the
department employees could interview the patients. Since many biological agents cause
upper respiratory problems, it would be important to distinguish between a deliberate
terrorist source and a natural source. A collection of definitions of the syndromes that are
defined by symptoms is available from the CDC. See SYNDROME DEFINITIONS FOR
DISEASES ASSOCIATED WITH CRITICAL BIOTERRORISM-ASSOCIATED AGENTS 4-6 (2003),
available at http://www.bt.cdc.gov/surveillance/syndromedef/pdf/syndromedefinitions.pdf.
72 However, systems could be changed to incorporate patient names. William B. Lober
et al., Syndromic Surveillance Using Automated Collection of Computerized Discharge
Diagnoses, 80 (Supp. 1) J. URB. HEALTH i97, i103 (2003).
73 Reingold, supra note 70, at 78-81.
74 Brewin, supra note 70 (“Some senior health officials questioned the value of disease
surveillance systems described in the Bush administration’s plan . . . . Dr. Rex Archer,
health director of Kansas City, Mo., and president of the National Association of County
and City Health Officials, said NBIS would need a level of funding and national
commitment comparable to the 1960s’ space race to deliver what the plan calls for within a
year.”).
75 David L. Buckeridge et al., Evaluating Detection of an Inhalational Anthrax Outbreak,
12 EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES 1942, 1946 (2006); Reingold, supra note 70, at 79.
76 See Richard Pérez-Peña, System in New York for Early Warning of Disease Patterns,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 4, 2003, at A1 (citing the views of Dr. Farzad Mostashari, then assistant
commissioner for epidemiology services for the New York City Health Department). But
see Lawrence O. Gostin, When Terrorism Threatens Health: How Far Are Limitations on
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Today, surveillance systems primarily use names to improve statistical
accuracy in compiling incidence and prevalence data. Because most systems
require reports from physicians, hospitals, and laboratories, a person might be
reported more than once a year. Surveillance systems use names to deduplicate reports, ensuring that no case is counted more than once. Most state
health departments send the case reports they receive to the CDC.77 State
health departments replace each patient’s name, however, with a Soundex
code.78 While the CDC does not need (or even want) to know the patients’
identities, the information it collects may nonetheless make that possible.79
B.

Identifying Newborns for Essential Medical Care

Newborn genetic screening programs are designed to diagnose newborns
with genetic anomalies causing severe developmental disabilities that could be
prevented by beginning simple treatments soon after birth. Almost all
programs are modeled on phenylketonuria (PKU) screening, which began in
the 1960s.80 By the mid 1970s, more than forty states required PKU testing for

Personal and Economic Liberties Justified?, 55 FLA. L. REV. 1105, 1129 (2003) (citing a
CDC report that advocated for health department surveillance in order to contain bioterrorist
attacks).
77 See CDC, National Notifiable Disease Surveillance System, 1989, http://
wonder.cdc.gov/wonder/sci_data/misc/type_txt/nndss89.asp (last visited Apr. 1, 2007).
78 Instructions on how to construct a Soundex code for names are available from the
National Archives and Records Administration, an independent federal agency. See Nat’l
Archives & Records Admin., Soundex Indexing, http://www.archives.gov/publications/
general-info-leaflets/55.html (last visited Apr. 1, 2007). The code uses the first letter of a
person’s surname followed by three numbers assigned to the consonants next appearing in
the name: 1 = B, F, P, V; 2 = C, G, J, K, Q, S, X, Z; 3 = D, T; 4 = L; 5 = M, N; 6 = R; 0 =
no additional letters in name. It offers examples: the name Washington is coded W252, and
Gutierrez is coded G362. Id. The result gives a phonetic result without the vowels or H, W,
and Y. Some websites automatically convert a surname to a Soundex code. See, e.g.,
ProGenealogists, Soundex Code Generator, http://www.progenealogists.com/soundex.htm
(last visited Apr. 1, 2007).
79 Individuals might be identified by comparing the phonetic name with other identifying
information on the reporting form, such as date of birth, sex, race, and address. Like many
organizations concerned with statistical accuracy, the CDC strongly encourages providers to
complete all the information requested on reporting forms and evaluates the surveillance
programs it funds on the basis of, among other things, the completeness of reports. See
CDC, UPDATED GUIDELINES, supra note 22, at 16.
80 PKU results from a defective enzyme for metabolizing phenylalanine, a common
amino acid in protein-rich food, and causes severe neurological damage. A diet low in
phenylalanine can prevent or reduce the damage, if begun during infancy. See OFFICE OF
TECH. ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONG., HEALTHY CHILDREN: INVESTING IN THE FUTURE 107 (1988)
(estimating that the United States saved $3.2 million dollars for every 100,000 newborns
screened for PKU and hypothyroidism, or $93,000 per diagnosed case, in 1986).
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newborns.81 These laws effectively require physicians to provide, and parents
to accept, good medical care for an individual child. Indeed, proponents view
mandatory PKU testing laws as enforcing both a legal and an ethical duty of
parents to their children.82
Newborn genetic screening laws, however, do not necessarily ensure
treatment for the newborn.83 By itself, testing serves only a diagnostic
function. The disability can only be prevented with proper treatment.
Screening laws that fail to assure treatment cannot serve the function of
protecting children. They may only insert the health department into the
physician-patient relationship.84
Today, almost all of the four million children born each year in the United
States have a few drops of blood drawn (usually from the heel) to be tested for
PKU and other genetic conditions.85 Few parents refuse genetic testing. Most

81

Nat’l Human Genome Research Inst., The History of Newborn Phenylketonuria
Screening in the U.S., http://biotech.law.lsu.edu/research/fed/tfgt/appendix5.htm (last
visited Apr. 1, 2007).
82 See, e.g., Ruth R. Faden et al., Parental Rights, Child Welfare, and Public Health: The
Case of PKU Screening, 72 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1396, 1397 (1982). But see Ellen Wright
Clayton, Screening and Treatment of Newborns, 29 HOUS. L. REV. 85, 87-88 (1992)
(arguing for genetic screening of newborns “only when children can derive substantial
benefit from early detection” and when “parents can participate in the screening process”).
Parents have a common law, and in some states statutory, duty to provide medically
necessary care for their children. See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 167 (1944)
(“[T]he state has a wide range of power for limiting parental freedom and authority in things
affecting the child’s welfare; and . . . this includes, to some extent, matters of conscience
and religious conviction.”); Saratoga County Dep’t of Soc. Servs. v. Hofbauer (In re
Hofbauer), 393 N.E.2d 1009, 1013 (N.Y. 1979) (“[T]he Legislature has imposed upon the
parents of a child the non-delegable affirmative duty to provide their child with adequate
medical care.”). But see In re Green, 292 A.2d 387, 392 (Pa. 1972) (“We are of the opinion
that as between a parent and the state, the state does not have an interest of sufficient
magnitude outweighing a parent’s religious beliefs when the child’s life is not immediately
imperiled by his physical condition.”). See generally Walter Wadlington, Medical Decision
Making for and by Children: Tensions Between Parent, State, and Child, 1994 U. ILL. L.
REV. 311 (discussing the development of case law imposing medical treatment for children
despite a lack of parental consent).
83 See Kenneth D. Mandl et al., Newborn Screening Program Practices in the United
States: Notification, Research, and Consent, 109 PEDIATRICS 269, 270 (2002) (finding that
only twenty-two states conducted follow-up to confirm that treatment had begun).
Screening programs do not typically provide treatment, which often consists of special diets
that can be expensive and are not generally covered by health insurance.
84 See ASSESSING GENETIC RISKS: IMPLICATIONS FOR HEALTH AND SOCIAL POLICY 261-63
(Lori B. Andrews et al. eds., 1994) [hereinafter ASSESSING GENETIC RISKS].
85 U.S.
GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, NO. GAO-03-449, NEWBORN SCREENING:
CHARACTERISTICS OF STATE PROGRAMS 1 (2003), available at http://www.gao.gov/
new.items/d03449.pdf. For current comparative data on state laws requiring screening for
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experts agree that newborns should be tested for a condition that is reasonably
serious, can be identified with a reliable test, and can be treated with relatively
simple and effective measures.86 Between six and eight genetic and metabolic
conditions meet these criteria.87 In the absence of an accurate test or safe,
effective treatment, however, testing carries risks that parents have
traditionally been permitted to avoid for their children.88
New technology can now identify many genetic aberrations for which no
treatment exists. Tandem mass spectronomy and DNA analysis make it
possible to analyze a single blood sample for dozens of genetic and metabolic
conditions at a cost far below testing for several conditions independently.89 In
2005, the American College of Medical Genetics recommended that all
newborns be screened for twenty-nine diseases.90 The report generated
criticism because so few of the diseases have effective treatments.91 Its

specific conditions, see Nat’l Newborn Screening & Genetics Res. Ctr., National Newborn
Screening Status Report, http://genes-r-us.uthscsa.edu (last visited Apr. 1, 2007).
86 See, e.g., Clayton, supra note 82, at 87-88; Jean-Louis Dhondt & Jean-Pierre Farriaux,
Impact of French Legislation on Neonatal Screening, in HUMAN DNA: LAW AND POLICY
285, 286 tbl.I (Bartha Maria Knoppers ed., 1997).
87 These conditions include PKU, congenital hypothyroidism, classical galactosemia,
hemoglobinopathies (such as sickle cell disease), congenital adrenal hyperplasia, biotinidase
deficiency, maple syrup urine disease, and homocystinuria. The last two, however, do not
have genuinely effective treatments. ASSESSING GENETIC RISKS, supra note 84, at 100
(recommending against screening for conditions for which there is no beneficial treatment).
88 See, e.g., George J. Annas, Mandatory PKU Screening: The Other Side of the Looking
Glass, 72 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1401, 1402 (1982) (discussing the potential stigma and fear
caused by false positive results during newborn genetic testing); Sheila Wildeman &
Jocelyn Downie, Genetic and Metabolic Screening of Newborns: Must Health Care
Providers Seek Explicit Parental Consent?, 9 HEALTH L.J. 1, 2-3 (2001) (discussing the
potential stigma attached to a child who tests positive for a genetic condition that has no
treatment).
89 See American Academy of Pediatrics Taskforce, Newborn Screening: A Blueprint for
the Future, 106 PEDIATRICS 389, 389 (2000) [hereinafter Newborn Screening]; see also Neo
Gen Screening, Inc. v. New Eng. Newborn Screening Program, 187 F.3d 24, 26 (1st Cir.
1999) (describing Neo Gen’s claim that it had developed a more comprehensive, cheaper
testing procedure than that in use by Massachusetts at the time). For recent screening cost
estimates when employing tandem mass spectronomy, see PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS,
NEWBORN SCREENING PROGRAMS: AN OVERVIEW OF COSTS AND FINANCING 14-16 (2001),
available at http://www.marchofdimes.com/files/Final_PWC_NBS_Report2.pdf.
90 Request for Public Comment on a HRSA Commissioned Report, Newborn Screening:
Toward a Uniform Screening Panel and System, 70 Fed. Reg. 11,247 (Mar. 8, 2005).
91 See, e.g., Jeffrey R. Botkin et al., Newborn Screening Technology: Proceed with
Caution, 117 PEDIATRICS 1793, 1794 (2006). In addition, if new tests are added before they
are validated, they can produce false positives that result in damaging a child who receives
treatment inappropriately. See Norman Fost, Genetic Diagnosis and Treatment: Ethical
Considerations, 147 AM. J. DISEASES CHILD. 1190, 1191 (1993) (arguing that, in the early
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recommendations, however, have been embraced by organizations like the
March of Dimes and parent groups advocating research to develop diagnostic
tests or treatments for genetic conditions.92
For conditions for which there is no treatment, the blood samples and linked
information are used almost exclusively for research, such as testing
experimental diagnostic assays to determine their sensitivity, specificity, and
reliability, estimating the incidence and prevalence of genetic conditions, and
searching for risk factors.93 The screening program effectively creates a DNA
bank. As more states expand their mandatory newborn screening laws to
include these additional conditions, they may confront the question of whether
their power to protect children includes the power to create a DNA bank for
future research.94
New York City’s diabetes blood sugar reporting system also identifies a
chronic medical condition, but for very different reasons.95 Unlike early PKUtype newborn screening programs, there is no imperative for immediate
treatment to prevent major disability. To be sure, people with diabetes who get
their blood sugar levels under control are less likely to develop health
problems like heart disease and glaucoma in the future. However, blood sugar
levels are not the only risk factor affecting patients with diabetes. Chronic
diseases like diabetes are caused by complex factors and may develop into
more serious medical problems only over a long period of time. Finally, most
diabetes patients are adults, and virtually all those whose blood sugar levels are
reported are under the care of physicians. So far, the specific purpose of the
program remains murky. It could be to monitor or change physicians’
treatment of diabetes, change patient behavior, or collect data for research on
diabetes. In the long term, it may be intended to reduce the government’s
Medicaid costs for patients with diabetes.
C.

Research

Data collected from surveillance are used for a variety of research studies.
Cancer registries are perhaps the most salient example. In the mid-1930s, the
years of its use, the special diet designed for infants with PKU caused neurological damage
in children erroneously diagnosed with the disease).
92 See Newborn Screening, supra note 89, at 389.
93 See Richard S. Olney et al., Storage and Use of Residual Dried Blood Spots from State
Newborn Screening Programs, 148 J. PEDIATRICS 618, 618 (2006).
94 For discussion of whether the consent of blood and tissue donors should be required
for future research uses of their samples, see LORI ANDREWS & DOROTHY NELKIN, BODY
BAZAAR: THE MARKET FOR HUMAN TISSUE IN THE BIOTECHNOLOGY AGE 21-23 (2001);
NAT’L BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMM’N, 1 RESEARCH INVOLVING HUMAN BIOLOGICAL
MATERIALS: ETHICAL ISSUES AND POLICY GUIDANCE 62-71 (1999); Ellen Wright Clayton,
Informed Consent and Biobanks, 33 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 15, 18-20 (2005); Mark A.
Rothstein, Expanding the Ethical Analysis of Biobanks, 33 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 89, 92-93
(2005).
95 See discussion supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text.
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Connecticut Medical Society began collecting information about patients with
various cancers to see if it could identify successful treatments.96 The idea was
to help physicians improve patient care.97 Since then, other organizations have
initiated programs with similar goals.98 Cancer registries typically collect
detailed personally identifiable information, primarily so that they can contact
patients periodically to update information.99 The data are ordinarily submitted
by hospitals, clinics, or physicians, either voluntarily with patient consent or
pursuant to a mandatory reporting law. Most registries receive multiple reports
about the same person and de-duplicate the reports by comparing names and
dates of birth.
The National Cancer Institute (NCI) established its Surveillance,
Epidemiology and End Results (SEER) program in 1973 with a similar focus
on analyzing methods of cancer treatment and outcomes.100 Consistent with
the NCI’s mission, SEER focuses on conducting medical research studies.
SEER currently collects data from population-based registries covering over
twenty-five percent of the U.S. population.101 The actual operation of the
registries is typically delegated to universities, where researchers analyze the
data and produce reports. They also follow cases annually to find out how
many patients remain alive and to calculate survival rates. SEER publishes
anonymous statistics on cancer annually, based on data collected about two
years earlier.102

96 Conn. State Med. Soc’y, History & Milestones, http://www.csms.org/index.php?
option=com_content&task=view&id=35&Itemid=43 (last visited Apr. 1, 2007).
97 Id.
98 CDC, NPCR Cancer Surveillance System Rationale and Approach, http://
www.cdc.gov/cancer/npcr/training/css.htm (last visited Apr. 1, 2007) [hereinafter NPCRCSS] (“Cancer surveillance is the ongoing, timely, and systematic collection and analysis of
information on cancer risk factors (such as lifestyle factors, behavioral influences, genetic
predispositions, or environmental exposures), screening and early detection, new cancer
cases, cancer deaths, extent of disease at diagnosis, treatment, clinical management, and
survival.”).
99 Private, professional organizations, including the National Cancer Registrars
Association and the North American Association of Central Cancer Registries (NAACCR),
set voluntary standards for collecting data, such as definitions and data formats, and criteria
for completeness, timeliness, and quality of the data. See generally N. AM. ASS’N OF CENT.
CANCER REGISTRIES, 2 STANDARDS FOR CANCER REGISTRIES: DATA STANDARDS AND DATA
DICTIONARY (Lori A. Havener & Dianne Hultstrom eds., 11th ed. 2006), available at http://
www.naaccr.org/filesystem/pdf/Volume%20II%20Version%2011.1.pdf. The standards may
vary with the specific goals of particular registries. See generally Judith Swan et al., Cancer
Surveillance in the U.S., 83 CANCER 1282 (1998).
100 See Nat’l Cancer Inst., Overview of the SEER Program, http://seer.cancer.gov/about
(last visited Apr. 1, 2007).
101 Id. (listing the states, cities, and rural areas from which data is collected).
102 See
Nat’l Cancer Inst., SEER – Frequently Asked Questions, http://
www.seer.cancer.gov/faq (last visited Apr. 1, 2007).
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The National Cancer Act was amended in 1992 to authorize the CDC to
fund cancer registries in areas not covered by SEER.103 The Act now requires,
as a condition of eligibility for funding, that the data held by a CDC-funded
cancer registry be made available for a wide range of research, both by the
registry itself and by unrelated public or private entities.104 The difference
between the NCI and CDC registries reflects the different methods the
agencies use to collect data. The NCI uses a representative sample of cancers
to make estimates for the country. The CDC collects data from case reports of
every case of disease.
Most registries authorize external researchers to use registry data in a variety
of research studies.105 Personal identifiers make it possible to link cancer
registry data to many other data sources, including the Behavioral Risk Factor
Surveillance Survey, environmental health department records, Medicare and
Medicaid health records, health insurance records, the National Death Index,
death certificates and other vital statistics records, geographic information
systems, census records, and registries of licensed practitioners (e.g.,
physicians, nurses, plumbers) and other specific populations (e.g., Vietnam
Veterans registry). As information technology advances, the possible linkages
are endless.
103 See Cancer Registries Amendment Act, Pub. L. No. 102-515, 106 Stat. 3372 (1992)
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 280e (2000)). The Cancer Registries Amendment Act authorized
the CDC to “make grants to States” and to “make grants or enter into contracts with
academic or nonprofit organizations designated by the State to operate the State’s cancer
registry.” Id. § 3, 106 Stat. at 3372 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 280e(a)). The Act further
provided that the data to be collected in the CDC-funded registries would include:
(1) demographic information about each case of cancer;
(2) information on the industrial or occupational history of the individuals with the
cancers, to the extent such information is available from the same record;
(3) administrative information, including date of diagnosis and source of information;
(4) pathological data characterizing the cancer, including the cancer site, stage of
disease (pursuant to Staging Guide), incidence, and type of treatment; and
(5) other elements determined appropriate by the Secretary.
Id., 106 Stat. at 3373 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 280e(a)). CDC grant application requirements
specified that “demographic information” should include the patient’s name, address, census
tract, race, sex, birth date, and social security number. National Program of Cancer
Registries, 59 Fed. Reg. 26,800, 26,801 (May 24, 1994).
104 See 42 U.S.C. § 280e(c)(2)(D)(vi)-(vii); see also State Cancer Registries: Status of
Authorizing Legislation and Enabling Regulations – United States, October 1993, 43
MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 71, 74 (1994) (“[T]he federal statute requires
authorization of cancer registries under state-specific laws and promulgation of regulations
that ensure case reporting and use of data for research. . . . Registries provide a means for
collecting such information and may assist in conducting population-based epidemiologic
and biologic research, allocating of health resources, and evaluating cancer-control and
cancer-prevention programs.”).
105 See, e.g., Kathleen McDavid et al., Prostate Cancer Incidence and Mortality Rates
and Trends in the United States and Canada, 119 PUB. HEALTH REP. 174, 175 (2004).
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Several states have gone beyond authorizing the creation of cancer
registries, and have enacted laws or adopted regulations that either permit or
require medical providers to report cancer cases to a registry without their
patients’ consent.106 In some states, advocacy groups lobbied state legislatures
and health departments for a centralized source of information, either in an
attempt to explain unusually high rates of cancer in their communities or in
response to fears of exposure to hazards from local manufacturing plants.107
The more important factor appears to be the availability of federal grant funds
to create or expand a registry.108 CDC prefers that registries be located in
states that require the reporting of cancer cases by law.
Although the National Cancer Act does not require states to enact any
particular laws, undoubtedly because such a federal requirement would violate
state sovereignty,109 grants are unlikely without a mandatory reporting law.
The Act requires that statewide cancer registries be legally authorized to obtain
all medical records of cancer patients from any individual or organization
providing cancer services in order to be eligible for funding.110 It would be
difficult to assure access to “all records” without dispensing with consent.111
Arguably, any use of personally identifiable surveillance data – apart from
outbreak investigation and epidemic containment – could qualify as research
with human subjects. Cancer registries squarely present the question of
whether the state can demand access to an individual’s personally identifiable
information for use in research without consent. Since the Nuremberg Code

106 See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 103875-103885 (West 2007) (creating a
cancer registry and exempting healthcare workers from liability for reporting case
information); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 111, § 111B (2004) (requiring submission of
information on certain brain tumors to state registries); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 5-37.3-4(b)(18)
(2007) (allowing disclosure of case information to cancer registries without first obtaining
patient consent).
107 See, e.g., Doug Abrahms, CDC Tries To Create State-by-State Cancer Database,
GANNETT NEWS SERVICE, Dec. 29, 2002.
108 While some states had cancer registries for many years, few had enough staff or
resources to conduct the research that made their data useful. When NCI funded its SEER
sites, a more sophisticated cancer tracking and research program developed in its locations.
Elsewhere, data collection depended on the creativity of registry personnel and cooperation
from hospitals. Hospitals reportedly pay their cancer registrars more than state cancer
registries do. Jeff Parrott, Indiana Not Part of National Cancer Report, J. & COURIER
(Lafayette, Ind.), Nov. 29, 2002, at 1A.
109 See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 912 (1997).
110 42 U.S.C. § 280e(c)(2)(D)(iii) (2000).
111 Dispensing with the consent requirement appears vulnerable to challenge as a
warrantless search in violation of the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable
searches and seizures. See Tucson Woman’s Clinic v. Eden, 371 F.3d 1173, 1179 (9th Cir.
2004) (finding a Fourth Amendment violation where Arizona regulations required abortion
providers to submit to “warrantless, unbounded inspections of their offices and provide
DHS inspectors access to unredacted medical records”).
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was issued in 1947, research with human subjects has been deemed unethical
and unlawful unless the subject gives voluntary, informed consent.112 The
consent requirement is intended to protect the individual’s right of selfdetermination and the dignity of human beings recognized in all international
declarations and covenants on human rights.113 Without informed consent,
humans are being treated only as a means to an end.114 These foundational
principles have been embodied in the common law,115 and in regulations
112 The first principle of the Nuremberg Code is that “the voluntary consent of the human
subjects is absolutely essential.” See 1 NAT’L BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMM’N, ETHICAL AND
POLICY ISSUES IN RESEARCH INVOLVING HUMAN PARTICIPANTS app. C, at 151 (2001),
available at http://www.georgetown.edu/research/nrcbl/nbac/human/overvol1.pdf. For an
analysis of the Code’s legal status in the United States, see generally George J. Annas, The
Nuremberg Code in U.S. Courts: Ethics Versus Expediency, in THE NAZI DOCTORS AND THE
NUREMBERG CODE 201 (George J. Annas & Michael A. Grodin eds., 1992).
113 See, e.g., Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217(III)A art. 1, U.N.
GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948).
114 See IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK FOR THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 45 (Allen W.
Wood ed. & trans., Yale Univ. Press 2002) (1785) (“[T]he human being, and in general
every rational being, exists as end in itself, not merely as means to the discretionary use of
this or that will, but in all its actions, those directed toward itself as well as those directed
toward other rational beings, it must always at the same time be considered as an end.”).
115 See, e.g., Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., No. 01 Civ. 8118, 2002 WL 31082956, at *1, 3-4
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 17, 2002) (denying defendant’s motion to dismiss because the plaintiffs’
complaint, which alleged that the defendant had administered experimental antibiotics to
plaintiffs without their informed consent, adequately stated a claim under the Alien Tort
Claims Act), vacated in part, 77 F. App’x 48 (2d Cir. 2003); Diaz v. Hillsborough County
Hosp. Auth., No. 8:90-CV-120-T-25B, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14061, at *21 (M.D. Fla.
Aug. 7, 2000) (approving a settlement in which the defendant compensated a class of
pregnant women for conducting research studies on them without their consent); In re
Cincinnati Radiation Litig., 874 F. Supp. 796, 821 (S.D. Ohio 1995) (“The Nuremberg Code
is part of the law of humanity. It may be applied in both civil and criminal cases by the
federal courts in the United States.”); Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Inst., Inc., 782 A.2d 807,
844 (Md. 2001) (stating that “[a] human subject is entitled to all material information,” and
rejecting the defendant’s claim that it obtained consent because “full material information
was not furnished to the subjects”); T.D. v. N.Y. State Office of Mental Health, 650
N.Y.S.2d 173, 176 (N.Y. 1996) (striking down regulations which allowed research on
mental health patients who were incapable of giving informed consent, because the
regulations “violate the State and Federal constitutional rights to due process, as well as the
common law right to personal autonomy, of the patients”). But cf. Robertson v. McGee, No.
01-CV-60-C, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4072, at *6-8 (N.D. Okla. Jan. 28, 2002) (dismissing a
claim brought by cancer research subjects because the “right to be treated with dignity”
established in the Nuremberg Code does not give rise to a private cause of action); White v.
Paulsen, 997 F. Supp. 1380, 1383 (E.D. Wash. 1998) (finding that “non-consensual medical
experimentation violates the laws of nations,” but declining to imply the existence of a
private right of action for violation of such international law). See generally Wendy K.
Mariner, Human Subjects Research, Law, Common Law of Human Experimentation, in 2
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ETHICAL, LEGAL, AND POLICY ISSUES IN BIOTECHNOLOGY 654 (Thomas H.
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governing federally funded research known as the “Common Rule,”116 and
may have constitutional protection.117 All of these sources support the
conclusion that the use of personally identifiable information for research
purposes without the subject’s consent violates the subject’s rights.118
Some public health advocates resist the idea that surveillance programs
involve “research” with human subjects, and instead argue that most, if not all,
surveillance constitutes public health “practice.”119 This argument is based on
an analogy to principles of research ethics that distinguish medical research
from medical practice, in order to identify which activities are subject to state
and federal laws governing research with human subjects.120 This analogy,
Murray & Maxwell J. Mehlman eds., 2000) (summarizing common law causes of action in
the context of human subjects research).
116 See Federal Policy for the Protection of Human Subjects, 56 Fed. Reg. 28,002 (June
18, 1991). The Common Rule harmonized regulations of more than twenty federal
departments and governs human subject research funded by, or submitted to, those
departments. See 21 C.F.R. pts. 50, 56 (2006) for the FDA version of the Common Rule,
and 45 C.F.R. pt. 46 (2006) for the Department of Health and Human Services version.
Most universities, medical centers, and research institutions have executed general
assurance agreements with federal agencies, agreeing to apply the Common Rule to all
research conducted at the institution, regardless of the source of funding.
117 See United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669, 687 (1987) (Brennan, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (suggesting that the Constitution protects a right to human
dignity, like that described in the Nuremberg Code, which would prohibit research on
humans without the subject’s knowledge and consent); id. at 710 (O’Connor, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part) (same). Both courts and claimants have begun to cite the
Nuremberg Code as support for the conclusion that research without subject consent is
unlawful. See cases cited supra note 115.
118 See, e.g., 45 C.F.R. § 46.102(f) (2006) (defining a human subject to include “a living
individual about whom an investigator . . . conducting research obtains . . . [i]dentifiable
private information”).
119 See JAMES G. HODGE, JR. & LAWRENCE O. GOSTIN, COUNCIL OF STATE & TERRITORIAL
EPIDEMIOLOGISTS, PUBLIC HEALTH PRACTICE VS. RESEARCH 16 (2004), available at
http://www.cste.org/pdffiles/newpdffiles/CSTEPHResRptHodgeFinal.5.24.04.pdf; Amy L.
Fairchild, Dealing with Humpty Dumpty: Research, Practice, and the Ethics of Public
Health Surveillance, 31 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 615, 617 (2003). Local public health officials
are likely to characterize surveillance as practice rather than research because they are the
first to receive case reports and conduct outbreak investigations, in contrast to the CDC,
which receives reports from state health departments and conducts more long-range analysis
that would normally be seen as research.
120 See Belmont Report: Ethical Principles and Guidelines for the Protection of Human
Subjects of Research, Report of the National Commission for the Protection of Human
Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research, 44 Fed. Reg. 23,192, 23,193 (Apr. 18,
1979) [hereinafter Belmont Report] (“For the most part, the term ‘practice’ refers to
interventions that are designed solely to enhance the well-being of an individual patient or
client and that have a reasonable expectation of success. The purpose of medical or
behavioral practice is to provide diagnosis, preventive treatment or therapy to particular
individuals. By contrast, the term ‘research’ designates an activity designed to test an
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however, misses the point. By itself, the fact that an activity might be
considered “practice” does not mean that participation can be compelled. For
example, a physician’s treatment recommendation to her patient is part of
medical practice, but this does not mean that the patient must obey it.
Although the federal commission and scholars have distinguished medical
practice from research, none has repudiated informed consent to medical care.
Similarly, the fact that an activity might be considered research does not
always mean that it requires consent.121
The real issue is whether the state may compel the reporting of personally
identifying information without first obtaining the person’s consent for a
specific purpose. The answer to that question depends not on whether an
activity is characterized as “research” or “practice,” but on the scope and limits
of the government’s sovereign power and whether compelled disclosure of
identifying patient information infringes upon constitutionally protected rights.
Furthermore, the idea that there is some special set of endeavors called
public health practice may be an illusion. All government agencies can equally
call what they do “practice.” Indeed, the programs and activities that public
health officials call practice are precisely the same in kind, if not in subject
matter, as those of almost every other government agency, from the
Department of Agriculture to the Securities and Exchange Commission. And
almost all these agencies also conduct research. The fact that public health can
be a government function does not exclude surveillance from constitutional
constraints.122 Law enforcement is also a government function, but that does
not authorize the police to obtain information about a person in violation of the
Fourth Amendment. Similarly, the fact that reporting to a cancer registry is
required by state law does not answer the question of whether the law itself is
constitutional.
More far-reaching is the argument that public health surveillance is not
research because it is intended to promote the public good in much the same
way that standard medical care is intended to personally benefit a patient.
Most medical research also is intended to promote the public good. Similarly,
virtually all public health programs are intended to benefit the population as a
whole, whether by stopping an epidemic or by collecting data that might be
hypothesis, permit conclusions to be drawn, and thereby to develop or contribute to
generalizable knowledge (expressed, for example, in theories, principles, and statements of
relationships).” (emphasis added) (footnote omitted)).
121 Some categories of research might justifiably be conducted without consent, such as
research using anonymous data and the collection and analysis of vital statistics from birth,
marriage, and death certificates. These categories are also not considered to be surveillance,
strictly defined. Berkelman et al., supra note 37, at 759.
122 See HODGE & GOSTIN, supra note 119, at 22 (arguing that the states’ police powers
“justify virtually any exercise of state or local government to preserve, protect, or promote
the public’s health that does not infringe constitutionally protected . . . rights”). Moreover,
public health is not limited to government agencies. Private organizations also provide
public health services and conduct public health research.
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analyzed to identify a risk that might be studied in the future to determine
whether it might cause disease. Thus, using intent as a standard would
virtually eliminate the rights of research subjects.123
Instead, a more objective standard is necessary to identify what counts as a
research activity requiring consent. In this vein, the National Commission for
the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research
chose to distinguish research from practice based on how the project is
“designed.”124 If a project is designed to obtain generalized knowledge, rather
than help an identifiable patient, it is research. In the public health context,
this would mean that research includes projects designed to determine the
incidence and prevalence of diseases, to identify common risk factors for
diseases by analyzing data, and to evaluate the effectiveness of particular
preventive or treatment measures by comparing results, as well as other studies
aimed at gleaning similarly generalized knowledge.125
Different public health surveillance programs serve very different functions.
To complicate matters, the same program can serve a different function at each
level of surveillance.126 For instance, some contagious disease programs are
designed for outbreak investigation at the first level, while at the second level
the data almost exclusively serve research and vital statistics functions.
Similarly, newborn genetic screening programs serve to protect newborns from
severe treatable conditions on the first level of surveillance, while on the
second level serve only a research function. A surveillance program may
justifiably collect personally identifiable data at the first level for some
purposes and uses, but not others, without patient consent. However, that does
not necessarily answer the question of whether such data may then be further
disclosed to researchers without first obtaining consent for secondary and
tertiary uses.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION OF MEDICAL INFORMATION PRIVACY
The central question is whether there is a right of privacy that prevents the
government from obtaining medical information about an individual to be used
for various public health surveillance purposes without first obtaining the
individual’s consent. States adopt reporting laws, of course, because most
recognize common law, if not statutory, rights of privacy and confidentiality in
123

See Belmont Report, supra note 120, at 23,193 (rejecting intent as too subjective a
standard for distinguishing medical practice from medical research).
124 Id.
125 Recognizing the research components of public health surveillance does not preclude
also recognizing some exceptions to the requirements for consent for the development and
dissemination of information like vital statistics. However, such activities should be
recognized as exceptions to general rules for research, and specifically justified by factual
and conceptual arguments that do not depend upon spurious distinctions between research
and practice.
126 See supra figure 1.
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medical information, which forbid physicians from disclosing patient
information and records without consent.127 Additionally, federal courts of
appeal have recognized Fourteenth Amendment protection for a person’s
privacy interest in personal medical information and from involuntary
disclosure to state and federal agencies.128
Unfortunately, this extensive body of case law provides little guidance for
determining the justifications for mandatory reporting laws. Such laws have
rarely received judicial review. The few U.S. Supreme Court decisions that
have addressed the subject have granted state legislatures substantial, but not
unlimited, deference. But the Court has yet to consider the constitutionality of
modern public health surveillance systems – specifically those that compel
disclosure of personally identifiable medical information to allow deduplication and ensure that such data are accurate enough to be used for
research and budget analyses. Indeed, the Court’s decisions have rarely
analyzed the actual use of the data to be collected, referring to it generally as

127 See, e.g., Hill v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 865 P.2d 633, 658 (Cal. 1994)
(recognizing an informational privacy interest “in limiting disclosure of confidential
information about bodily condition”); Alberts v. Devine, 479 N.E.2d 113, 118-19 (Mass.
1985) (describing a public policy rationale for recognizing a physician’s duty to not disclose
medical information without the patient’s consent). See generally DANIEL J. SOLOVE &
MARC ROTENBERG, INFORMATION PRIVACY LAW 207-10 (2003). State constitutions also
often protect privacy more explicitly than the Federal Constitution. See, e.g., CAL. CONST.
art. 1, § 1 (“All people are by nature free and independent and have inalienable rights.
Among these are . . . pursuing and obtaining safety, happiness, and privacy.”).
128 See, e.g., Doe v. Delie, 257 F.3d 309, 317 (3d Cir. 2001) (holding that prisoners have
a constitutional right of privacy in their medical information); Sterling v. Borough of
Minersville, 232 F.3d 190, 197 (3d Cir. 2000) (same); Denius v. Dunlap, 209 F.3d 944, 956
(7th Cir. 2000) (stating that the right of confidentiality “clearly covers medical records and
communications”); Bartnicki v. Vopper, 200 F.3d 109, 122 (3d Cir. 1999) (recognizing the
right “not to have intimate facts concerning one’s life disclosed without one’s consent”),
aff’d, 532 U.S. 514 (2001); Doe v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 72 F.3d 1133, 1138 (3d Cir. 1995)
(acknowledging a limited constitutional right to privacy in one’s prescription records);
A.L.A. v. W. Valley, 26 F.3d 989, 990 (10th Cir. 1994) (“There is no dispute that
confidential medical information is entitled to constitutional privacy protection.”); Doe v.
City of New York, 15 F.3d 264, 267 (2d Cir. 1994) (“Individuals who are infected with the
HIV virus clearly possess a constitutional right to privacy regarding their condition.”);
Schaill v. Tippecanoe County Sch. Corp., 864 F.2d 1309, 1322 n.19 (7th Cir. 1989)
(recognizing “a substantial privacy interest in the confidentiality of medical information”);
In re Search Warrant (Sealed), 810 F.2d 67, 71 (3d Cir. 1987) (stating that the
constitutionally protected right to privacy encompasses medical records); Trade Waste
Mgmt. Ass’n v. Hughey, 780 F.2d 221, 234 (3d Cir. 1985) (recognizing that personal
medical history is protected from random government intrusion). But see Doe v. Wigginton,
21 F.3d 733, 740 (6th Cir. 1994) (holding that a prison official’s disclosure of a prisoner’s
HIV status to other corrections officers did not violate the prisoner’s constitutional right to
privacy); J.P. v. DeSanti, 653 F.2d 1080, 1090 (6th Cir. 1981) (“[T]he Constitution does not
encompass a general right to nondisclosure of private information.”).
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intended to prevent disease or promote public health. In light of recent
challenges to the use of personal medical information for other purposes,129
however, it is unlikely that such surveillance programs will remain under the
radar forever.
In Whalen v. Roe,130 the Supreme Court upheld a state law requiring any
physician who prescribed a Schedule II controlled substance to submit a copy
of the prescription to the New York State Department of Health.131 The
petitioners had challenged the law’s requirement that patients’ names and
addresses be collected and retained by the state, arguing that it violated their
right to privacy as protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.132 The law was
intended to prevent the diversion of drugs into “unlawful channels,”
specifically by preventing individuals from obtaining controlled substances
from more than one physician or using stolen or altered prescriptions,
preventing pharmacists from refilling dangerous prescriptions, and preventing
physicians from over-prescribing.133 If prevention failed, the records would
enable investigators to identify – and possibly prosecute – those who were
breaking the law. Not surprisingly, the Court found that the goal was
reasonable,134 and that the prescription system “could reasonably be expected
to have a deterrent effect on potential violators as well as to aid in the detection
or investigation of specific instances of apparent abuse.”135 The Court noted
129

See, e.g., Nw. Mem’l Hosp. v. Ashcroft, 362 F.3d 923, 932-33 (7th Cir. 2004)
(affirming the district court’s decision to quash a Department of Justice subpoena seeking
the medical records of patients who had received late-term abortions); Aid for Women v.
Foulston, 427 F. Supp. 2d 1093, 1096 (D. Kan. 2006) (permanently enjoining enforcement
of the Attorney General’s opinion that physicians must report all consensual underage
sexual activity because his opinion was inconsistent with the reporting statute’s language).
130 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
131 Id. at 603-04; see also N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW §§ 3331(6), 3332(2)(a), 3334(4)
(McKinney 2002). Prescriptions were filed with the Bureau of Controlled Substances,
Licensing and Evaluation. Schedule II drugs include drugs that have some recognized
medical uses, but are also subject to some potential for abuse: opium and its derivatives,
cocaine, methadone, amphetamines, and methaqualone. Whalen, 429 U.S. at 592-93 & n.8.
132 Whalen, 429 U.S. at 598 & n.23. Petitioners claimed that the law violated both their
right to informational privacy – by taking their personal information without their consent –
and their right to make personal decisions about their own medical care without government
interference. Id. at 599-600. They argued that the requirement discouraged physicians from
prescribing necessary and appropriate Schedule II drugs, and discouraged patients from
accepting treatment with such drugs for fear of being stigmatized. Id. at 595 n.16, 600.
133 Id. at 591-92.
134 Id. at 597-98.
135 Id. at 598 (footnote omitted); see also ACT-UP Triangle v. Comm’n for Health Servs.
of N.C., 483 S.E.2d 388, 396 (N.C. 1997) (upholding the state health commission’s decision
to end anonymous HIV testing by local health departments and institute confidential
reporting of names); cf. N.Y. State Soc’y of Surgeons v. Axelrod, 572 N.E.2d 605, 606-07
(N.Y. 1991) (upholding the Commissioner of Health’s exercise of discretion in refusing to
add HIV infection to the list of notifiable diseases “on the ground that . . . it would
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that the reporting requirement was not “meaningfully distinguishable from a
host of other unpleasant invasions of privacy that are associated with many
facets of health care,”136 comparing it to “reporting requirements relating to
venereal disease, child abuse, injuries caused by deadly weapons, and
certifications of fetal death.”137
Other Supreme Court decisions on reporting laws have focused specifically
on abortion recordkeeping where the woman’s name was not reported. In
Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth,138 the Supreme Court
upheld a Missouri law that required reporting data on abortions performed in
the state:
Recordkeeping and reporting requirements that are reasonably
directed to the preservation of maternal health and that properly respect
a patient’s confidentiality and privacy are permissible. . . . [O]ne may
argue forcefully . . . that the State should not be able to impose any
recordkeeping requirements that significantly differ from those imposed
with respect to other, and comparable, medical or surgical procedures.
We conclude, however, that the [Missouri] provisions . . . , while perhaps
approaching impermissible limits, are not constitutionally offensive in
themselves. Recordkeeping of this kind, if not abused or overdone, can
be useful to the State’s interest in protecting the health of its female
citizens, and may be a resource that is relevant to decisions involving
medical experience and judgment.
The added requirements for
confidentiality, with the sole exception for public health officers, . . .
assist and persuade us in our determination of the constitutional limits.139
Later decisions offer little guidance on how to apply Danforth’s
standards.140 In Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v.
Casey,141 the Supreme Court upheld a Pennsylvania statute that required all

discourage cooperation of affected individuals and would lead to the loss of confidentiality
for those infected with the disease”).
136 Whalen, 429 U.S. at 602.
137 Id. at 602 n.29. But cf. id. at 607 (Brennan, J., concurring) (“The central storage and
easy accessibility of computerized data vastly increase the potential for abuse of that
information, and I am not prepared to say that future developments will not demonstrate the
necessity of some curb on such technology.”).
138 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
139 Id. at 80-81 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
140 See, e.g., Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747
(1968). In Thornburgh, the Court struck down a Pennsylvania statute requiring physicians
to report information about abortion procedures. The information, which would be made
available for public inspection, included each woman’s age, race, marital status, and number
of prior pregnancies; the date of her last menstrual period; the basis for any determination
that the fetus was not viable; and the method of payment – but not the woman’s name or
address. See id. at 767-68.
141 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
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abortions to be reported without the patient’s name.142 The Court, however,
struck down the law’s requirement that the report include a woman’s reasons
for not notifying her husband of the abortion, suggesting that the state could
not require reporting of information about something that it could not
constitutionally require of women in the first place.143
The Whalen Court had distinguished the line of cases protecting what it
called “the individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters” from
those protecting “independence in making certain kinds of important
decisions,”144 such as raising children,145 marriage,146 and procreation.147 Yet,
in the abortion cases, the Court seems to have blended the two almost from the
beginning. As one appellate court has suggested, “[t]he more intimate or
personal the information, the more justified is the expectation that it will not be
subject to public scrutiny.”148 The Supreme Court has recognized that the right
to refuse medical treatment may be an aspect of liberty protected by the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments.149 And, although it has not expressly addressed
non-life-threatening medical decisions, such as diagnostic tests for cancer,
diabetes, or HIV, common law protection of patient decision-making
autonomy within the privacy of a physician-patient relationship is well

142

Id. at 900. The statute at issue in Casey provided: “For the purpose of promotion of
maternal health and life by adding to the sum of medical and public health knowledge
through the compilation of relevant data, and to promote the Commonwealth’s interest in
protection of the unborn child, a report of each abortion performed shall be made to the
department on forms prescribed by it. The report forms shall not identify the individual
patient by name . . . .” 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3214(a) (1990), quoted in Casey, 505 U.S.
at 909-10.
143 Casey, 505 U.S. at 901.
144 Whalen, 429 U.S. at 599-600.
145 See Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925).
146 See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).
147 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,
485 (1965).
148 Walls v. City of Petersburg, 895 F.2d 188, 192 (4th Cir. 1990); see also Sheets v. Salt
Lake County, 45 F.3d 1383, 1387 (10th Cir. 1995) (“If an individual has a legitimate
expectation of confidentiality, then ‘[d]isclosure of such information must advance a
compelling state interest which, in addition, must be accomplished in the least intrusive
manner.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Mangels v. Pena, 789 F.2d 836, 839 (10th Cir.
1986))); Fraternal Order of Police, Lodge No. 5 v. City of Phila., 812 F.2d 105, 110 (3d Cir.
1987) (“Most circuits appear to apply an ‘intermediate standard of review’ for the majority
of confidentiality violations, with a compelling interest analysis reserved for ‘severe
intrusions’ on confidentiality.” (citations omitted)).
149 See Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278 (1990); see also Vacco v.
Quill, 521 U.S. 793, 797 (1997) (holding that New York’s prohibition on assisting suicide
does not violate the Equal Protection Clause, even though patients have a constitutional
right to refuse lifesaving medical treatment).
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settled.150 Reporting laws that could deter patients from making diagnostic or
treatment decisions may deserve more searching analysis.
A few recent lower court decisions suggest that a more searching analysis
might be forthcoming, one that demands a closer fit between the government’s
interest and the value of the information sought. In 2004, the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals found that several provisions of Arizona’s abortion law
violated patients’ informational privacy rights by requiring providers to release
identifiable patient records unnecessarily.151 The law allowed the state
Department of Health Services to “access unredacted patient medical records
and retain copies in their offices,” and required providers to submit copies of
ultrasound prints to a private contractor.152 Following its earlier decisions, the
court found that “[e]ven if a law adequately protects against public disclosure
of a patient’s private information, it may still violate informational privacy
rights if an unbounded, large number of government employees have access to
the information.”153 Because the provision had no safeguards to prevent the
release of identifiable information to “government employees who [had] no
need for the information,”154 and because “there [was] little, if any, need for
much of [the] information, such as the names and addresses of patients,”155 the
court concluded that the regulation violated the informational privacy rights of
the patients.156 The court also reasoned that the goal of monitoring clinic
compliance with laws governing clinic licensure and abortion restrictions
“could easily be satisfied using a coding system to track records without the
release of patient identifying information.”157 “Finally,” it concluded, “while
the public interest involved – promoting health and safety – is of course a
strong one, we fail to see how insisting on unredacted materials promotes this
need.”158 This decision suggests that at least some judges may be unwilling to

150 See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 269-73. See generally GEORGE J. ANNAS, THE RIGHTS OF
PATIENTS 246-72 (3d ed. 2004).
151 Tucson Woman’s Clinic v. Eden, 379 F.3d 531, 553 (9th Cir. 2004).
152 Id. at 551.
153 Id. at 551-52.
154 Id. at 552.
155 Id.
156 Id. at 553. The court also found that Arizona regulations requiring abortion providers
to submit to warrantless, unbounded inspections of their offices violated the Fourth
Amendment. Id. at 551. The court concluded that abortion clinics were not a closely
regulated industry, where expectations of privacy are diminished. Id. at 550. Rather, “the
expectation of privacy is heightened, given the fact that the clinic provides a service
grounded in a fundamental constitutional liberty, and that all provision of medical services
in private physicians’ offices carries with it a high expectation of privacy for both physician
and patient.” Id. Fourth Amendment issues are beyond the scope of this Article.
157 Id. at 553.
158 Id.
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uphold the release of identifiable medical information without a more
particularized need.159
IV. WHAT DOES PUBLIC HEALTH JUSTIFY?
The preceding discussion argued that cases like Whalen and Danforth do not
answer the question of whether the state has the power to compel the reporting
of identifiable medical information for modern public health surveillance uses.
While the Supreme Court has granted considerable deference to legislative
determinations of the need for mandatory reporting, it has not considered data
uses far removed – both in time and function – from immediate investigations
where the information contained names. Particularly unsettled in that context
are both the characterization of the right to privacy in one’s personal medical
information and the standard of review to be applied in evaluating laws
compelling disclosure.
This part outlines possible options for reviewing modern public health
surveillance reporting laws. Section A explores why standards for reviewing
specific requests for records pursuant to subpoena are inapposite. Section B
then critiques the use of the government’s interest in an undefined concept of
public health as a goal justifying mandatory reporting, while Section C argues
for a more robust concept of medical information privacy. Section D explains
why these constitutional principles assume particular importance where federal
funding influences the substance of state reporting laws.
A.

Unanswered Questions

As seen in both Whalen and the line of abortion decisions, courts typically
balance the government’s interest in information with an individual’s interest
in preventing its release. Most decisions outside the context of reporting laws
have also considered the following factors, described in United States v.
Westinghouse Electric Corp.:
the type of record requested, the information it does or might contain, the
potential for harm in any subsequent nonconsensual disclosure, the injury
from disclosure to the relationship in which the record was generated, the
adequacy of safeguards to prevent unauthorized disclosure, the degree of
need for access, and whether there is an express statutory mandate,
articulated public policy, or other recognizable public interest militating
toward access.160

159 See also Planned Parenthood of S. Ariz. v. Lawall, 307 F.3d 783, 794 (9th Cir. 2002)
(Ferguson, J., dissenting) (“[I]t is not only disclosure that is prohibited. It is intrusion
itself. . . . Simple curiosity or suspicion, the need to keep statistics, or the mere performance
of government work is not enough to justify the intrusion permitted by the Arizona statute.
The state must show a particularized, legitimate government need.”).
160 United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d 570, 578 (3d Cir. 1980).
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However, there is little explicit discussion of whether all the Westinghouse
factors should be considered or what weight each should bear. In the absence
of a more structured weighting system, the test can devolve into a framework
for rationalizing decisions based on other grounds.
Westinghouse applied this test not to a reporting law, but to a petition by the
National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) to enforce its
subpoena for employee medical records.161 NIOSH sought the records from
Westinghouse as part of an investigation into the possible workplace exposure
of company employees to hexahydrophthalic anhydride.162 Both the facts and
procedural posture in Westinghouse make it an improbable precedent for a
general public health exception to privacy.163 NIOSH was responding to an
employee request for an investigation into the cause of employee health
problems. It made a one-time request for records of specific employees, which
Westinghouse could and did contest.164
To evaluate an ongoing requirement for reporting patient information in the
absence of any immediate investigatory need, more specific issues should be
considered:
(1) whether the information is personally identifiable (contains
personal information sufficient to identify the individual whose
information it is);
(2) whether the information is collected with or without the person’s
consent;
(3) what present or future uses will be made of the information;
(4) whether subsequent uses will be with or without the person’s
consent;

161 Statutes authorizing agencies to subpoena medical records for certain investigations,
such as medical licensure violations, are distinct from general reporting laws. The subpoena
power granted to many public agencies poses a lesser risk, primarily because those affected
have an opportunity to challenge the subpoena and receive a judicial hearing. See, e.g.,
Schachter v. Whalen, 581 F.2d 35, 36-37 (2d Cir. 1978) (upholding the statutory power of a
state medical licensure board to subpoena records of patients treated with laetrile or MA-7
by a particular physician as part of its investigation of the physician’s professional conduct).
162 Westinghouse, 638 F.2d at 572.
163 The majority of decisions referencing the Westinghouse factors involve demands to
review information about particular individuals, such as applicants for employment. See,
e.g., Weissberg v. Riverside Twp. Bd. of Educ., 180 F. App’x 357, 365 (3d Cir. 2006). But
see Sterling v. Borough of Minersville, 232 F.3d 190, 195 (3d Cir. 2000) (“We cautioned,
however, that the right [in Westinghouse] is not absolute. Public health or like public
concerns may justify access to information an individual may desire to remain
confidential.”).
164 Westinghouse, 638 F.2d at 573.
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(5) whether the information will be combined or linked with
information from other sources to create new information;
(6) whether the combined or linked information makes it possible to
identify individuals;
(7) whether the information will be disclosed by the recipient to third
parties;
(8) whether the information will be re-disclosed by the third parties to
fourth and fifth parties;
(9) whether the information will be kept secure and inaccessible to
anyone without authorization to view it;
(10) whether the information will be kept or destroyed after use by each
user;
(11) whether the information will be kept confidential by those
authorized to view it; and
(12) whether there is an enforceable (statutory or contractual) duty to
keep the information secure and confidential on the part of all
parties (recipient, third parties, etc.).
The first question – whether the information is identifiable – is a threshold
matter in reviewing any government access to information. As suggested by
the sixth factor, however, even information that excludes individual names
may be individually identifiable.165 Given the increasing linkages among
government databases, the protection of initial anonymity is diminishing.
B.

Ultimate Goals and Immediate Functions

Any attempt to specify principles for determining justifiable invasions of
privacy runs into the problem of defining public health purposes.166 Most
judicial opinions in cases challenging government demands for personal
information perpetuate, rather than clarify, this threshold definitional problem.
165

Protection against revealing identities may prove increasingly difficult to maintain.
See Latanya Sweeney, Maintaining Patient Confidentiality When Sharing Medical Data
Requires a Symbiotic Relationship Between Technology and Policy 3-15 (MIT Artificial
Intelligence Lab., Working Paper No. AIWP-WP344b, 1997), available at http://
privacy.cs.cmu.edu/dataprivacy/projects/law/aiwp.pdf (comparing various methods intended
to de-identify medical record data, and describing ways to identify individuals with limited
information, such as birth date and zip code). It is even possible to identify the addresses of
patients represented only by black dots on a map. John S. Brownstein et al.,
Correspondence, No Place To Hide – Reverse Identification of Patients from Published
Maps, 355 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1741, 1741-42 (2006) (selecting nineteen medical journal
articles that contained “maps with the addresses of patients plotted as individuals dots,” and
determining the precise address of 432 of the 550 patients plotted on those maps).
166 See discussion supra Part II.
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Courts either fail to specify what they mean by public health, or seem to have
an understanding that is different from what is intended by public health
agencies. While a judge may be thinking of outbreak investigation, public
health agencies may have in mind the longer-term goal of using data in a
research study to find a cure for cancer.
Compounding the possible misunderstanding, courts in cases like Whalen
and Danforth have limited their analyses to the justification for the initial
collection of information – the first level of surveillance. The laws at issue in
these first generation cases did not contemplate secondary or tertiary reporting;
courts had no need to consider re-disclosures other than accidental or negligent
breaches of confidentiality at the first level. Yet it is the subsequent release of
information to other public agencies and private entities that dominates the
structure of many current surveillance programs. Moreover, a program’s
function can and often does change from level to level. If the different
surveillance levels are not viewed independently, the public health purpose of
the first level of reporting may be conflated with the ultimate use of the data.
The concept of public health as a legitimate government goal is either emptied
of meaningful substance or stuffed with all visions of the general welfare.
Neither result serves us well.
Continued reliance on a broad, undefined concept of public health offers no
principled way to distinguish between essential responses to immediate threats
and unnecessary, compelled participation in research.167 It perpetuates a
highly utilitarian view of personhood, in which autonomy and privacy can be
sacrificed whenever they prove inefficient.168 The public health would
undoubtedly improve if all Americans were required to obey their physicians’
recommendations, eat a healthier diet, or exercise more. Required submission
to clinical research might also serve the public good by facilitating the
discovery of new medicines or ways to improve the quality of life. But if
mandatory submission to research and medical care seems unsettling, it might

167 For an argument favoring a broad interpretation of public health, see Gostin, supra
note 76, at 1168-69 (arguing that immediate risks to society from bioterrorism warrant
violating some personal liberties). For arguments favoring continuing protection of personal
liberties, see Wendy E. Parmet, Liberalism, Communitarianism, and Public Health:
Comments on Lawrence O. Gostin’s Lecture, 55 FLA. L. REV. 1221, 1223 (2003); Peter P.
Swire & Lauren B. Steinfeld, Security and Privacy After September 11: The Health Care
Example, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1515, 1518-23 (2002).
168 See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, The Right of Privacy, 12 GA. L. REV. 393, 409 (1978)
(offering an economic analysis of privacy rights). The many statutes enacted to protect the
privacy of information since the early 1970s, however, suggest that society may value
information privacy more than rational economic analysis would predict. Moreover, on the
bench, Judge Posner has expressed a more sympathetic view of privacy rights. See Nw.
Mem’l Hosp. v. Ashcroft, 362 F.3d 923, 932-33 (7th Cir. 2004) (protecting the privacy of
medical records requested for use in challenging the constitutionality of the Partial-Birth
Abortion Ban Act).
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suggest that such a notion of public health is too vague to justify broad
constraints on personal liberty.
A more rigorous approach to balancing government and individual interests
might be accomplished by abandoning vague characterizations of the
government’s interest, like public health, and substituting the government’s
actual intended use of information at each level of surveillance. The
distortions currently permitted by vague terminology on both sides of the
balancing test might be mitigated by more precise definitions of the interests to
be weighed and by assigning realistic present values to those interests, in a
manner analogous to decision analysis. For example, if the goal is to protect
newborns from developmental disabilities by providing immediate treatment,
the outcome is both clear and immediate and its value is high. If the goal is to
count how many people have a disease, the outcome is clear, but its present
value is low. If the goal is to improve longevity by seeing how many people
are exposed to a risk and then taking steps to prevent that risk, the outcome is
speculative and the present value is very low. Long-term public health goals
are highly contingent; they depend upon positive outcomes from a series of
future steps. One may need to collect data, analyze and compare results,
develop preventive recommendations, obtain funding, implement
recommendations, wait for results, and evaluate results to determine whether
recommendations worked or why they failed.
Once the goal and outcome are specified, the need for individually
identifiable information to achieve that goal is easier to assess. Certain goals,
such as outbreak investigation, may demonstrate an actual or at least plausible
need for identifiable information at the first surveillance level. The need for
names and other identifiable information may diminish significantly at
secondary and tertiary levels, depending on the specific goal and outcome
intended at that level. For example, names may be needed to investigate the
possibility of an outbreak of avian influenza, but unnecessary to prepare
reports to federal agencies for the purpose of compiling disease statistics. This
secondary goal would have a low present value that would not outweigh an
individual’s right to refuse the reporting of identifiable information at that level
of surveillance. Some secondary and tertiary research functions, however, may
reasonably require identifiable information. However, those functions would
require additional balancing against the individual’s right to decide whether to
participate in research at the time of use; secondary and tertiary goals should
not be conflated with, or justified by, initial goals.
Using the actual goal and its present value allows a balancing test that
compares the current benefits to public health with the current costs to
individuals. The Supreme Court appeared to support this approach when it
warned that government programs should not rely on long-range health goals
to justify the reporting of identifiable medical information without patient
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consent.169 This test, for example, would support the reporting of adverse drug
reactions to the FDA because an immediate response, such as removing drugs
from the market or halting a clinical research trial, may be needed to prevent or
limit actual harm to patients or research subjects.170 It would also support
traditional contagious disease reporting laws targeted at outbreak investigation
and epidemic containment – but it would not support laws related to diseases
or conditions requiring no immediate response (unless no individually
identifiable information were collected). Further, it would not support the
collection of any personally identifiable information solely for the purpose of
eliminating duplicates to obtain more precise numerical estimates.171
A balancing test requiring specific data uses is also less likely to permit
surveillance programs based on mandatory chronic disease case reports to
cancer registries. To the extent that the actual use of identifiable information
in such reports is to generate scientific hypotheses for research or to conduct
research studies, it is indistinguishable from ordinary research requiring the
patient’s consent.172 Similarly, mandatory newborn screening programs for
genetic conditions that cannot be treated have no immediate present value
beyond research and would be difficult to justify.173
These suggested outcomes reveal weaknesses in current assumptions about
the legitimacy of mandatory public health surveillance reporting laws. A more
rigorous approach to reviewing such laws may be more consistent with current
public opinion about medical privacy. As the federal government encourages
169

See Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 82-83 (2001) (“While the ultimate
goal of the program may well have been to get the women in question into substance abuse
treatment and off of drugs, the immediate objective of the searches was to generate evidence
for law enforcement purposes in order to reach that goal.”).
170 This is also consistent with the holding in Whalen, where the defendant used
prescription drug records to investigate possible crimes. See supra note 135 and
accompanying text.
171 The use of case reports to obtain an accurate count of all cases of disease has
disadvantages. The most salient is that it cannot count people who are not in medical care,
because it relies on health providers and laboratories to submit all reports. See COMM. ON
THE RYAN WHITE CARE ACT: DATA FOR RES. ALLOCATION, PLANNING & EVALUATION, INST.
OF MED., MEASURING WHAT MATTERS 80 (2004), available at http://www.nap.edu/catalog/
10855.html.
172 The CDC states that “[c]ancer surveillance is essential to a unified, scientific and
public health approach to cancer prevention and control.” NPCR-CSS, supra note 98.
Although presented as a premise, the CDC’s statement is a conclusion, and the evidence for
it is not provided. Assuming it is correct, however, it does not answer the question of
whether surveillance requires the use of case reports or whether it requires patient consent.
Cancer registries remain a repository for data that, without more, cannot prevent or control
cancer. See generally Bruce K. Armstrong, Perspective: The Role of the Cancer Registry in
Cancer Control, 3 CANCER CAUSES & CONTROL 569 (1992).
173 A more difficult question is whether the fact that technology makes it easier and
cheaper to screen for many conditions simultaneously rather than separately warrants
including the untreatable conditions in a mandatory program.
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combing databases of all kinds to find terrorists, the public may become
increasingly concerned about both the immediate need for and ultimate use of
surveillance data. Finally, continued trust in the medical profession may be
seriously eroded if patients fear that their personal information will be
disseminated far beyond their original expectations.174
C.

Privacy and Human Rights

In contrast to the broad, future-oriented ideas of public health they embrace,
first generation cases like Whalen sometimes treat patient privacy as narrow
and concrete. Under this approach, highly speculative benefits could be
accepted as legitimate reasons to override patient consent. At the same time,
costs to the patient must often be both probable and substantial, often in the
form of financial loss, in order to weigh in the balance. Even if public health
goals are more specifically identified, the definition of privacy in one’s
medical information may also require more precision in order to achieve
meaningful balance.
Like public health, the concept of privacy can be fraught with ambiguity and
possibilities for expansion. Privacy is often understood to mean an
individual’s right to control access to information about herself.175 Yet the
literature contains ample acknowledgement that this is hardly sufficient to
explain the many, sometimes contradictory, facets of privacy, much less its
exceptions.176 Certainly the Supreme Court has yet to define the whole of its
scope and limits.

174

See George J. Annas, Puppy Love: Bioterrorism, Civil Rights, and Public Health, 55
FLA. L. REV. 1171, 1179-82 (2003) (arguing that public health programs cannot succeed
without retaining the public’s trust).
175 See ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 7 (1967) (“Privacy is the claim of
individuals, groups, or institutions to determine for themselves when, how, and to what
extent information about them is communicated to others.”); Geoffrey R. Stone, The Scope
of the Fourth Amendment: Privacy and the Police Use of Spies, Secret Agents, and
Informers, 1976 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 1193, 1207 (describing the right to privacy as a
person’s right “to control the flow of information about him”).
176 See, e.g., CHARLES FRIED, AN ANATOMY OF VALUES: PROBLEMS OF PERSONAL AND
SOCIAL CHOICE 142 (1970) (arguing that privacy is necessary to the values of love,
friendship, and trust, which require intimacy and sharing private information); PRIVACY
PROT. STUDY COMM’N, PERSONAL PRIVACY IN AN INFORMATION SOCIETY 21 (1977) (stating
that privacy can be both “a societal value and . . . an individual interest”); JEFFREY ROSEN,
THE UNWANTED GAZE: THE DESTRUCTION OF PRIVACY IN AMERICA 200-12 (2000)
(describing privacy as a means to avoid being judged unfairly on isolated bits of data, a
retreat to permit personal identity growth, and protection against offenses to one’s dignity);
Ken Gormley, One Hundred Years of Privacy, 1992 WIS. L. REV. 1335, 1340 (arguing that
legal privacy consists of five interrelated species); Robert C. Post, Three Concepts of
Privacy, 89 GEO. L.J. 2087, 2087 (2001) (“Privacy is a value so complex, so entangled in
competing and contradictory dimensions, so engorged with various and distinct meanings,
that I sometimes despair whether it can be usefully addressed at all.”); William L. Prosser,
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Even in the absence of consensus on the overall concept, however, it is still
both possible and defensible to treat personal medical information privacy as a
specific aspect of privacy for the purpose of examining when that information
is justifiably subject to involuntary disclosure – and re-disclosure – to
government. The analysis of the concept of privacy for purposes of public
health surveillance should be limited to information, from whatever source,
about an identifiable individual’s health status, medical care, genetic
characteristics, personal behavior, or exposure to health risks.
The Supreme Court has referred to information privacy in part as “‘the
individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters.’”177 This
“disclosure” can take several forms. The first and most commonly thought of
is disclosure to the public, in the form of deliberate or negligent publication of
personal facts to society at large. This is the type of injury that impelled
Warren and Brandeis to argue for a right to privacy.178 However, it is probably
the least likely harm to individuals whose information is reported to a public
health surveillance program.
The second form of disclosure, and the primary focus of this discussion, is
the compulsory revelation or transmission to a government agency. As
emphasized by several judges in the abortion cases discussed above, this form
of disclosure is more accurately characterized as a possible invasion of
privacy, because, metaphorically at least, the government forces its way into
one’s personal space to extract information that a person wishes to keep secret.
This form of disclosure/invasion takes place at each level of surveillance.
While concern for deliberate or negligent revelations to the public at large may
exist with respect to any collection of information, including information
voluntarily disclosed, it is likely that the core concern of information privacy is
with invasions of privacy in which the government obtains personal
information without consent.179

Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383, 389 (1960) (“The law of privacy comprises four distinct
kinds of invasion of four different interests of the plaintiff, which are tied together by the
common name, but otherwise have almost nothing in common except that each represents
an interference with the right of the plaintiff, in the phrase coined by Judge Cooley, ‘to be
let alone.’” (footnote omitted)); Daniel J. Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, 90 CAL. L. REV.
1087, 1126-29 (2002) (arguing that privacy can best be conceptualized not by isolating its
essential characteristics, but rather by examining the various specific contexts in which it
plays a role).
177 Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 457 (1977) (quoting Whalen v. Roe,
429 U.S. 589, 599 (1977)).
178 See Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV.
193, 196 (1890); see also Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
179 See Nw. Mem’l Hosp. v. Ashcroft, 362 F.3d 923, 929 (7th Cir. 2004) (“Even if there
were no possibility that a patient’s identity might be learned from a redacted medical record,
there would be an invasion of privacy.”).
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The concept of privacy attached to one’s personal information seems to
include, at its essence, a sense of autonomy and self-determination – not just
physical control over papers or computer files. Unlike other forms of property,
the information has value because of what it reveals about a person.180
Personal information is thus an aspect of the human being; it involves one’s
identity and dignity.181 Loss of personal information can seem as much a
violation of a person’s dignity as a physical invasion of the body. In this
respect, privacy protects one’s sense of self. When government has the power
to take that personal knowledge, it invades that sense of self. This may be why
the violation of privacy often provokes feelings of outrage, even when the facts
acquired are not embarrassing. An invasion of privacy violates one’s dignity,
even if it fails to produce economic injury. Yet courts have failed to frame this
aspect of privacy as a cognizable cause of action.
Even though not everyone would agree on what types of information would
be embarrassing if revealed, the central issue is whether that choice is theirs to
make. If we conclude that the information should be revealed because a
majority of people don’t care, we dispense with the principle that everyone has
prima facie control over the choice of revelation. That is not an especially
persuasive argument against requiring consent, and it fails to consider whether
revelation should be a matter of personal or social choice. Even where there is
a persuasive argument for social choice, the question remains whether that
choice should be made through legislation or by some other more stringent
mechanism, such as obtaining a warrant based on probable cause.
Changes in social and cultural norms are often reflected in debates over
privacy. Alan Westin argues that privacy protects conduct that is consistent
with social norms.182 Socially accepted behaviors are typically relegated by
consensus to the sphere of private life and personal choice, whereas socially
unacceptable conduct is labeled a matter of public concern that should not be
left to personal choice.183 To be sure, consensus does not mean unanimity, and
different sectors of society often revisit and revise the social norms according
to their personal and political philosophies. The most wrenching debates
180

For discussion of the concept of information as property and the use of DNA, see
generally ROBERT F. WEIR & ROBERT S. OLICK, THE STORED TISSUE ISSUE: BIOMEDICAL
RESEARCH, ETHICS, AND LAW IN THE ERA OF GENOMIC MEDICINE (2004); Gary E. Marchant,
Property Rights and Benefit-Sharing for DNA Donors?, 45 JURIMETRICS J. 153 (2005).
181 Galison and Minow make a related argument that privacy “takes its significance from
its association with a widely (but not universally) shared notion of self.” Peter Galison &
Martha Minow, Our Privacy, Ourselves in the Age of Technological Intrusions, in HUMAN
RIGHTS IN THE ‘WAR ON TERROR,’ supra note 8, at 258, 284.
182 Alan F. Westin, Social and Political Dimensions of Privacy, 59 J. SOC. ISSUES 431,
433 (2003).
183 For example, contraception, once the subject of criminal prohibition, is generally
considered a matter for personal choice without public or government interference. See id.
at 438; see also James A. Morone, Morality, Politics, and Health Policy, in POLICY
CHALLENGES IN MODERN HEALTH CARE 13, 14 (David Mechanic et al. eds., 2005).
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undoubtedly take place as people begin to shift their perceptions of specific
behaviors from unacceptable to acceptable or the reverse.
The expanding concept of public health suggests that we may currently be
experiencing a shift in perceptions about the social legitimacy of health status.
Contemporary debates over illicit drugs, tobacco, alcohol, and now obesity and
“fitness” suggest that these behaviors and conditions are moving from the
sphere of personal choice to that of public interest. This trend contrasts with
the transition of many earlier behaviors, such as the use of contraception, from
public to private status. The emotion revealed in the current debates also
suggests that people whose lifestyles or health statuses are targeted recognize
that they are prospective subjects of public scrutiny and perhaps eventually
regulation. The more that certain behaviors or conditions are viewed as
affecting the public – or public health – the more likely it is that the
government will claim an interest in access to personal information about those
behaviors and conditions. For this reason, the government’s claim to
information can appear to be especially threatening to a person’s sense of self.
This all suggests that the Supreme Court’s separation of privacy into distinct
areas of self-determination and information, while on the surface a seemingly
logical and generally accepted distinction, may miss the central importance of
information privacy. Information reveals past decisions, actions, risks, or
consequences that define who an individual is. Thus, government control over
the decision to reveal such information is more like the abortion decision than
is conventionally thought.
One argument against this concept of information privacy is that individuals
should not necessarily be entitled to control all information about themselves,
even to protect their own dignity. For example, a convicted criminal is not
able to prevent the fact of his or her conviction from becoming a matter of
public record (not to mention front-page news, depending on the notoriety of
the case). The idea that one should be able to define himself can conflict both
with the fact that no one can wholly control what others really think and with
the value placed on truth. The idea that one should be able to control
information about oneself, then, states the claim too broadly. The most salient
question becomes: What is relevant information to which society may
legitimately claim entitlement? Refined for purposes of surveillance, the
question becomes: What is relevant identifiable information that the
government may legitimately obtain without consent?
Both the government’s claim of entitlement to information and the
individual’s claim of entitlement to control (or withhold) information seem
more or less compelling depending upon the content of the information.
Information about one’s health status, however, seems an easy case for
personal control. Even when a patient voluntarily gives the information to a
physician, it remains secreted within a confidential relationship that is
protected by public policy and law. Information in medical records is not part
of a public repository, and it should not be treated as though it were an effort-
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free source of data.184 Consent to medical care cannot realistically be
presumed to include consent to any and all uses of identifiable information by
the state (or private parties).185
There are circumstances in which the government may demonstrate a real
and immediate need for medical information to accomplish an important heath
goal. The Whalen court suggested that laws requiring the reporting of child
abuse, for example, leave patients with a lesser expectation of privacy in their
medical records.186 A closer analysis might reveal, however, that it is not that
the patient’s expectation of privacy is lessened in such instances, but that the
government’s demonstration of need for specific information in specific
circumstances overwhelms the expectation of privacy. If patient expectations
of privacy are deemed to be lessened by the existence of reporting laws, then
there is little basis for challenging the laws themselves.187 By carving out so
many broad exceptions to privacy to accommodate public health surveillance,
courts may leave medical privacy too tattered to endure.
In this regard, the International Bill of Human Rights188 offers a relevant
principle. Article 4 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights recognizes that at times states may need to restrict some human
rights in order to protect other human rights.189 For example, restrictions on
184 In Pierce County, Washington v. Guillen, 537 U.S. 129 (2003), a unanimous Court
noted that data compiled by state highway departments for the purpose of applying for
federal funds should not be used as an “effort-free tool” in litigation against the state. See
id. at 146. Although the case concerned the meaning of the state’s statutory evidentiary
privilege, the Court’s opinion stressed that the data collected by the state should not be
accessible to third parties unless they were otherwise entitled to obtain the information from
the state for independent reasons. See id.
185 Surveys of public opinion on privacy are notoriously unreliable, largely because how
the questions are framed can influence responses. Nonetheless, there is considerable
evidence of public support for medical record privacy. See supra note 50 and
accompanying text; see also Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health
Information, Background, 65 Fed. Reg. 82,462, 82,463 (2000) (summarizing testimony
presented during a hearing on a proposed HIPAA rule in favor of increased protection for
medical records).
186 Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 602 (1977).
187 See Galison & Minow, supra note 181, at 261 (“Without deliberate effort, a
downward spiral can become a vicious circle, eroding privacy through legal permission,
technological access to unprecedented amounts of personal information, and diminishing
public expectations of privacy.”).
188 The International Bill of Human Rights, available at http://www.ohchr.org/english/
about/publications/docs/part1_1.pdf, is composed of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.
189 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A
(XXI), art. 4, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 16, 1966),
available at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/a_cescr.htm (“[T]he State may subject
such rights only to such limitations as are determined by law only in so far as this may be
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personal liberty may be necessary to isolate a person with a dangerous
contagious disease who threatens to spread it to others.190 Additionally, access
to personal information could be justified by a compelling need to identify
terrorists. However, such restrictions remain carefully bounded exceptions to
the general obligation to protect liberty and privacy. The U.N. Committee on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights explained the limited reach of this
exception as follows:
Issues of public health are sometimes used by States as grounds for
limiting the exercise of other fundamental rights. The Committee wishes
to emphasize that the Covenant’s limitation clause, article 4, is primarily
intended to protect the rights of individuals rather than to permit the
imposition of limitations by States. Consequently, a State party which,
for example, restricts the movement of, or incarcerates, persons with
transmissible diseases . . . has the burden of justifying such serious
measures in relation to each of the elements identified in article 4. Such
restrictions must be in accordance with the law, including international
human rights standards, compatible with the nature of the rights protected
by the Covenant, in the interest of legitimate aims pursued, and strictly
necessary for the promotion of the general welfare in a democratic
society.191
This is, in essence, a rule against pretexts. The Committee’s explanation
offers a reminder that any limitation on liberty and privacy requires
demonstration that it actually contributes to preserving human rights, serves a
real purpose, and is “strictly necessary for the promotion of the general welfare
in a democratic society.” This reminder argues in favor of ensuring that
intrusions on medical privacy are not casually accepted for speculative longrange goals. In particular, it supports the idea that general assertions of public
health goals cannot justify overriding individual rights to refuse medical care
or participation in research.
D.

Reporting Conditions for Federally Funded Programs

Even if states adopted a more rigorous balancing test that weighed the
present value of a specific health goal against the value of medical information
privacy, it is still possible that public health surveillance programs would
nonetheless continue their mission creep. The impetus for many state
compatible with the nature of these rights and solely for the purpose of promoting the
general welfare in a democratic society.”).
190 For discussion of the human right to health, see generally Sofia Gruskin & Daniel
Tarantola, Health and Human Rights, in PERSPECTIVES ON HEALTH AND HUMAN RIGHTS 3
(Sofia Gruskin et al. eds., 2005); Eleanor D. Kinney, The International Human Right to
Health: What Does This Mean for Our Nation and World?, 34 IND. L. REV. 1457 (2001).
191 U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rights,
Report on the Twenty-Second, Twenty-Third and Twenty-Fourth Sessions, annex IV, ¶ 28,
U.N. Doc. E/2001/22, E/C.12/2000/21 (2001).
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reporting laws increasingly comes from federal agencies seeking data from
state and local agencies. Many state public health surveillance programs
depend on federal funding for their operation, and federal funding increasingly
comes with strings attached. Some, like HIV surveillance and CDC cancer
registry programs, condition funding on submitting reports to the federal
agency and complying with federal agency standards for the kind and amount
of information that must be reported.192 States that wish to create or continue a
surveillance program may feel pressure to enact laws that require detailed case
reporting of medical conditions, regardless of the merits of either the law or the
reporting system. In effect, such laws require providers to report to the state
identifiable information about their patients simply because the state has
agreed to send that information to a federal agency.
Of course, state laws enacted under such circumstances might be challenged
as violating medical privacy for the reasons discussed above. However, a
successful challenge could leave the state with little or no funding to conduct
needed surveillance in a constitutionally justifiable manner. Only a successful
challenge to the federal funding law or an agency’s implementing regulations
could alter the state’s financial situation. Such a challenge would undoubtedly
face significant obstacles in light of the generally deferential review that the
Supreme Court has given to the exercise of Congress’ spending power.193
Despite some judicial and scholarly arguments for a more robust application of
the requirement that a funding condition must advance the federal
government’s interest underlying the federal law authorizing the spending,194
the Court has not yet attempted a reconsideration of its conception of the

192

The Ryan White CARE Act may place additional financial pressure on states that
seek funding for HIV and AIDS treatment programs. Pursuant to the Act, Department of
Health and Human Services funding is distributed according to an allocation formula based
on the estimated number of cases in an area, “as indicated by the number of cases reported
to and confirmed by” the CDC. 42 U.S.C. § 300ff-28(a)(2) (2000); see also supra note 38
and accompanying text. The statute does not require any state to report to the CDC. Nor
does it specify what form any voluntary reports should take. Nevertheless, the CDC
interprets its mandate to “confirm” cases (together, perhaps, with its conditions on separate
funding for state surveillance programs) as allowing it to insist that states submit data from
case reporting systems that themselves require reporting patient names to the state health
department. Since states must enact legislation to compel named reporting, the effect is to
pressure states to enact mandatory named reporting laws in order to obtain funding, not for
surveillance, but for AIDS treatment programs.
193 See, e.g., South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 212 (1987); Oklahoma v. U.S. Civil
Serv. Comm’n, 330 U.S. 127, 143 (1947).
194 See Dole, 483 U.S. at 213 (O’Connor, J., dissenting); Lynn A. Baker, Conditional
Federal Spending After Lopez, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1911, 1914 (1995) (“[W]ith Dole, the
Court offered Congress a seemingly easy end run around any restrictions the Constitution
might impose on its ability to regulate the states.”). But see Erwin Chemerinsky, Protecting
the Spending Power, 4 CHAP. L. REV. 89, 90-93 (2001) (arguing for a broad interpretation of
the spending power).
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spending power. In practice, this may mean that conditions on spending are
likely to be upheld unless they would require the state to take action that would
itself be unconstitutional.195 However, if the Court were to recognize a more
searching analysis of mandatory reporting laws and find those compelling the
reporting of personally identifiable information for general research purposes
to be beyond the power of the states, then constitutional protection for medical
privacy might present an independent constitutional bar.196
CONCLUSION
The parallel growth of information technology, chronic diseases, and public
health programs has transformed the function of disease surveillance. Public
health surveillance provides databases for outbreak investigation, medical care,
and research of all kinds. In a post–September 11 world, where epidemics are
both rare and terrifying, emergency preparedness has encouraged more
expansive public health surveillance programs with links to multiple
independent sources of information. Public health’s contribution to reducing
premature death and illness should not be underestimated. Yet, like the public
reaction to terrorism surveillance, both the public and the judiciary may worry
that some calls to sacrifice personal privacy go too far.
If public health, writ large, is a sufficient public purpose to justify
compelled disclosures of identifiable medical information, then it may be
sufficient to justify the compelled disclosure of personal information for other
equally grand, non-health, purposes. It may also be sufficient to justify
limiting the liberty to consent to or refuse medical care and participation in
research. If, on the other hand, public health does not justify the use of
personally identifiable medical information for purposes beyond immediate
outbreak investigation, then many mandatory reporting laws are vulnerable to
challenge.
Public health encompasses so many functions and activities that far more
specificity is needed to begin to analyze exactly what kind of public health
purposes are sufficient to override an individual’s right to keep personal
information private. Whalen’s first generation balancing test fails to offer an
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Although a state might argue that it was compelled to accept the condition because of
its need for funding, this type of financial pressure has not yet been viewed as pressure that
“‘turns into compulsion.’” Dole, 483 U.S. at 211 (quoting Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301
U.S. 548, 590 (1937)); see also Michael T. Gibson, Congressional Authority To Induce
Waivers of State Sovereign Immunity: The Conditional Spending Power (and Beyond), 29
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 439, 440 (2002).
196 Separate issues are whether a state would be willing to challenge a federal funding
law at all and, if not, whether individuals would have standing to do so. In a footnote in
Pierce County, Wash. v. Guillen, 537 U.S. 129 (2003), the Supreme Court declined to
consider “whether private plaintiffs have standing to assert ‘states’ rights’ under the Tenth
Amendment where their States’ legislative and executive branches expressly approve and
accept the benefits and terms of the federal statute in question.” Id. at 148 n.10.
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adequate limiting principle for modern public health surveillance, especially
with respect to secondary and tertiary uses of data. When an undefined public
good is balanced against one person’s immediate, concrete harm, there is little
opportunity to seriously evaluate the merits of any possible invasion of
privacy. The deck is stacked before the game begins.
A more searching analysis – one that balances the present value of the
particular information to achieve specific public health functions against the
dignitary cost of invading privacy – may better align basic constitutional
principles with the real world of public health today. A limiting principle
based on the International Bill of Rights may retain the value of public health
surveillance for the common good without sacrificing the value of patient
privacy. It may also help to assure the public that their dignity as well as their
privacy will not be violated without justification.

